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ABSTRACT 
 
 
GARIVALTIS, LELAND Reconstructing the Concept of Terrorism After 
9/11: The case of FARC-EP in Colombia 
 
 
Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-
EP) is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that formed in the rural sections of Colombia in 
1966.  The guerilla group has claimed to fight for the marginalized Colombian.  Because 
this insurgent group disrupts the status quo, more recent hardliner governments of 
Colombia and the United States have vilified the organization publicly to denounce the 
legitimacy and goals of the Leftist guerillas as well as labeled them terrorists and narco-
terrorists. 
This thesis provides analysis and research to negate the comparison between the 
rural guerilla fighters and terrorist organizations, while it also provides evidence that 
challenges such ongoing policies and tactics of Colombia and the U.S. against the FARC-
EP.  The term “terrorism” will be examined critically to uncover the lack of legitimacy 
that, today, surrounds this over politicized idea.  In addition, the insistence on violence as 
a political mechanism in Colombian history, particularly between its main political 
parties, will contextualize the FARC-EP’s tactics and emergence as a political and 
military player in the battle between Leftist insurgent groups and both the armed forces 
and the paramilitaries of Colombia.  
Three seemingly random and unconnected chapters will be integrated in order to 
provide an intrinsic and authentic understanding behind the ideology, tactics, structure 
and support of the FARC-EP.  In order to argue against mainstream media and influential 
 ii
governments, deep analysis and sufficient evidence needs to be uncovered and 
established.  To provide an alternate depiction of the Leftist guerillas, this thesis had to 
investigate beyond information solely attributed to the FARC-EP.  Instead, it must begin 
with an understanding and dissection of the political and economic strife in Colombia 
since its independence. As discovered, the incessant violence in the country displayed by 
unrest between political parties of the Liberals and Conservatives is the primary cause for 
the outbreak of La Violencia and consequently the creation of guerilla republics.     
After analysis of Colombia’s violent past, the subsequent topic of unjust labeling 
of the FARC-EP as “terrorists” is confronted.  This section scrutinizes the transformation 
of the once tactical strategy to its present day recognition as a global fear due to the 
attacks of September 11.  Lastly, in order to unravel the reasoning behind U.S. and 
Colombian designation of the guerillas as “terrorists,” research moves towards 
uncovering the underlying motives behind U.S. policy in Colombia.  Plan Colombia is 
dissected to discover the implications of economic gains beyond that of the proclaimed 
“War on Drugs.”  The aggressive positions taken by the Colombian and U.S. 
governments against the FARC-EP have been publicly justified by the claims of counter-
narcotics, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, but in reality, economics drive the 
implementation of such policies and the calumny of the insurgency.  
Through personal accounts of both hostages and combatants, primary interviews, 
governmental documents, field journalism, researched secondary accounts, news sources 
and personal interviews research comes together to defend the marginalized fight against 
the status quo.  In addition, historical accounts have been compared and analyzed as well 
as modern implications towards the same topic of the FARC-EP’s struggle for equality. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
In 1982, at the Seventh Conference of Guerrilla Movement, Las Fuerzas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia advocated for the development of new strategies to take on 
more offensive military tactics and broaden their support base.  As a result, Ejército del 
Pueblo (People’s Army) was added to the insurgency’s title.  Thus, prior to 1982 the 
organization will be referred to as the FARC, and afterwards it will be referenced as the 
FARC-EP.1    
 The FARC developed out of civil society in the midst of violence and chaos in 
Colombia.  The time in which the guerillas formed is not only important because of the 
movement that emerged, but because it was the culmination of violence found among the 
disputing parties and dejected citizens.  Such violence has not seemed to subside in 
Colombia, and thus the nation is still entrenched in a long, violent civil war.  Therefore, it 
is important to begin with Colombian history, from Spanish colonization to the death of 
the prominent presidential-hopeful Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.  It is essential to understanding 
not only why the FARC emerged but also to comprehend the current violent situation 
within Colombia.  This violence is not solely attributed to the FARC-EP, but to other 
Leftist guerillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and the armed forces of the government as 
well.  The civil war in Colombia is vast and complicated.  Thus, a sole analysis of the 
FARC-EP, their structure, goals, projects and actions would not have any purpose 
without the context of the violent country, the dueling political parties or a grasp of the 
immense socio-economic inequality. 
                                                 
1 James J. Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: the Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP. 
(London: Pluto, 2010), 25. 
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 Secondly, understanding guerilla insurgencies is a feat in itself.  When combined 
with a hegemonic power of the United States that has a newly profound conception of 
terrorism, life as a militant Leftist organization that directly opposes the status quo is 
increasingly consequential.  The FARC-EP has therefore faced the scrutiny of both 
foreign and internal policy aimed and created to dismantle and discredit them.  
Furthermore, popular media’s portrayal of the insurgency highlights and deliberately 
discredits the social movement.  Both Colombian and United States’ administrations have 
used “counter narcotics,” “counter insurgency” and “anti-terrorist” rationales to 
implement policies and obtain monetary means to fight the FARC-EP.  The preferred 
result of these policies is to devastate the organization under the pretext of national 
security.  However, while the aforementioned grounds for combat and intervention are 
legitimate ploys in the eyes of the public, the underlying motivations are in actuality 
directly connected to economic and political objectives; they do not connote national 
security. 
 These unscrupulous policies of the Colombian and United States’ governments 
are found overwhelmingly in Plan Colombia, on a variety of levels.  Since the 
implementation of the Plan under the Pastrana administration until today, billions of 
dollars have been spent on military operations and tactics rather than on substitute-crop 
implementation and resources for the rural farmers.  In addition, there is ample evidence 
that connects U.S. policy in Colombia with U.S. corporations’ economic interests in 
natural resources.  United States’ investments and interests in Colombian resources and 
economics serve as fuel to vilify and publicly denounce the Leftist insurgency. 
 viii
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 Finally, the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 have 
consequently given the U.S. much leeway in their designation of foreign “terrorist” 
organizations.  The term has entered global society and in the process the meaning and 
connotation of the term has altered.  It has become the “red scare” of the recent decade. 
As a result, U.S. foreign policy has used the fight against “terrorism” to implement power 
abroad.  In conclusion, the labeling of the FARC-EP as “terrorists” or “narco-terrorists” 
is a politically charged allegation, which can be negated by the historical context of 
Colombia, the guerilla tactics and formation of the insurgency as well as its ideology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Understanding the FARC-EP: When Diplomacy Fails… 
 
 
Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-
EP) is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that formed in the rural sections of Colombia in 
1966.  The insurgency was created in order to support the increasing population of the 
countryside that suffered from the lack of land reform and the constraints of the 
Conservative party of 1946.  The country’s Liberal and Conservative parties were in 
constant dispute, and from this conflict came the period known as La Violencia where 
more than 200,000 people lost their lives primarily during the years from 1948 to 1958.1  
The violence broke out after the assassination of the prominent lawyer and popular land 
reformer, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.  As riots ensued and the Liberals and Conservatives 
fought for years in the countryside, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, also known as Tirofijo, and 
Jacobo Arenas imagined and created the FARC in order to aid agrarian society and the 
rural poor of the ungoverned and forgotten territories.2   
The media along with the United States and Colombian governments have twisted 
the line between guerrilla fighters and terrorists to portray the insurgency as the latter.  
This thesis will provide fair analysis and research to negate the comparison between the 
rural guerilla fighters and terrorist organizations.  The term “terrorism” will also be 
confronted and analyzed to uncover the lack of legitimacy that today surrounds the over 
politicized idea.  Furthermore, the use of violence and its prevalence since Colombia’s 
                                                 
1 Harvey F. Kline, Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés      
Pastrana (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 8. 
2 Alfredo Molano, "The evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group's long history," NACLA Report on the 
Americas 34: 2 (2000), 23-31 (http://www.proquest.com), Jan. 15, 2011. 
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Independence among political parties and disputing territories will contextualize the 
FARC-EP’s tactics.     
According to James Brittain, a professor and author of Revolutionary Social 
Change in Colombia, state-based reports, scholastic papers and popular media accounts 
have hypothesized the FARC-EP’s involvement in the coca industry and the drug trade 
while demonizing the group as a terrorist organization.3  However, through interviews 
with supporters, leaders and local farmers over the past several years, he unravels the 
truths behind the FARC-EP’s connections with coca production, the drug trade, money 
laundering and their political and military systems.  Furthermore, he provides evidence 
and arguments that demonstrate the FARC-EP’s commitment to their ideology and fight 
for social equality for the Colombian rural and urban working class populations.  It 
should also be noted that the guerilla’s means of income have in recent years intensified 
along with those of the paramilitary groups.  
 In connection with Brittain’s findings, the author of Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a 
Drug War Journalist in Colombia, Garry Leech, an independent journalist and editor of 
colombiajournal.org, reports from inside FARC-EP territories and proclaims the desire 
and perfunctory actions of the organization to continue on the path of social equality.  
Leech has spent years in conflict zones in Colombia, and these experiences allow for 
insight into the insurgency.  He reiterates the importance of Colombia’s history and the 
prevalence of violence that plagues it.  While his accounts recognize the violent acts of 
the FARC-EP, he understands the inequalities that persist and the struggle of the people 
                                                 
3 Brittain, 89.  
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who live outside of Bogotá as well as the purpose of the guerillas fight.4  Leech provides 
a well-researched and knowledgeable base of the violence and issues that are prominent 
in Colombia.  Furthermore, he is critical of U.S. involvement in the country, especially in 
regards to Plan Colombia.5    
To further discover the path and trabajo of the organization, other personal 
narratives such as former guerilla María Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo’s memoir, My Life as 
a Colombian Revolutionary, will be dissected and used to reflect on the inner workings of 
the FARC-EP and the relationships, roles, daily life and goals of the organization.  To act 
as a contrast, retellings of kidnapped peoples, mainly U.S. citizens and Colombian elites, 
will be examined and analyzed in search of governmental or media influences.  These 
accounts will simultaneously serve to acknowledge the use of force that does in fact exist 
within the organization.  Ingrid Betancourt’s Even Silence Has an End: My Six Years of 
Captivity in the Colombian Jungle coupled with U.S. citizens Marc Gonsalves, Tom 
Howes and Keith Stansell’s Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian 
Jungle are primary sources referenced to illustrate a comparative image of the guerillas. 
They provide an alternative depiction of the insurgency; they demonstrate the violent and 
desperate side of the FARC-EP that enables them to take arms and hostages in order to 
contend with and ameliorate their position with the Colombian government. 
 
Drug Connection—Paramilitary Presence   
The primary misconception, as developed and promoted mainly by mass media 
and both the U.S. and Colombian governments, is the insurgency’s association with the 
                                                 
4 Garry Leech, interview by Josh Rushing, After Words with Garry Leech, C-SPAN, Feb. 11, 2009 
(http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/284132-1). 
5 After Words with Garry Leech 
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drug trade. From this association, the label of “narco-terrorists” is now commonly 
associated with the group. Though there is immense speculation and information that 
connects the FARC-EP with the drug industry, their connection with coca production 
does not justify the insurgency’s classification as a terrorist organization.  Furthermore, 
the recent surge in the FARC-EP’s involvement with cocaine is due to the need to 
compete with the country’s paramilitaries that are heavily imbedded in the drug 
industry.6    Previously, the FARC-EP protected coca-growing peasants while they taxed 
the dealers.7  According to James Petras, a professor of sociology at Binghamton 
University, in 2002, former president Andrés Pastrana admitted, “contrary to U.S
Department propaganda, the FARC neither produces or sells coca or drugs.”
. State 
ore, 
 U.S. State 
                                                
8  Again, 
authors such as Petras, Brittain and Leech discuss the actualities of the FARC-EP’s 
association with drugs, violence and crime.  Although, it should be noted that much of 
their research is outdated and the insurgency has made changes to their policies towards 
the drug trade, it is all relative to the other conflicting Colombian powers.  Furtherm
the work of Brittain, Leech and Petras denotes different ideas than those of the
Department.  
For example, Leech says, “if FARC leaders are little more than the heads of a 
criminal organization, then they must be considered miserable failures,” meaning that the 
FARC-EP members do not live in luxury like the paramilitaries and notorious drug cartel 
leaders. 9 
 
6 Adam Isacson, phone interview by author, January 20, 2011. 
7 James Petras and Michael M. Brescia, “The FARC Faces the Empire,” Latin American Perspectives 27:5 
(2000), 134 (http://jstor.org/). 
8 Petras and Brescia, 134. 
9 Garry M. Leech Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2009), 238. 
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For them, it is a hard life spent sleeping on wooden planks, bathing in rivers, 
fighting odd tropical diseases, coping with separation from family and loved ones, 
and constantly moving from camp to camp to avoid U.S. intelligence-gathering 
efforts and the Colombian army.10  
 
 In the 1960s, the Colombian government passed legislation that allowed for self-
defense groups to form in order to protect their assets.  These types of groups developed 
throughout the country, and decades later paramilitaries surfaced directly from the initial 
self-defense organizations.  The most well-known and powerful paramilitary that 
emerged in Colombia was the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense 
Forces, AUC).11  The AUC united various self-defense organizations, many of which 
previously associated with and were followers of drug lords, local political and economic 
elites, as well as organized crime organizations.  However different, these paramilitary 
groups commonly united against the leftist FARC-EP, and confrontation between the two 
has persisted for years.  Although the Uribe administration claimed that paramilitaries no 
longer exist due to the 2003 agreement between the his administration and the AUC to 
demobilize, new branches and increasingly similar criminal groups have since formed.12 
The AUC, which has connections with the Colombian army and government, is 
responsible for the victimization of Colombian citizens.  They have displaced indigenous 
communities from their land, massacred civilians, and kidnapped political figures.13  
Brittain cites a piece written by a U.S. citizen who found herself in both paramilitary and 
FARC-EP territories.  She recounts that at paramilitary check points, one is interrogated, 
searched, intimidated and harassed.  She mentions stories of rape, theft and terrorization 
                                                 
10 Leech, Beyond Bogotá, 238. 
11 Stephanie Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups," Council on Foreign 
Relations,http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias_rightwing_paramilitaries_and_splinter_groups.
html#p2. (Jan. 22, 2011). 
12 Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups."  
13 Hanson, "Colombia’s Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups." 
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by government forces.  Whereas on the other hand, when she discusses the FARC-
EP, she says she was welcomed and never threatened.14  In the end, the paramilitaries 
have closer connections with both the U.S. and Colombian governments; yet, they are 
openly and directly linked to the drug trade and violence.  They partake in assassinations 
as well as kidnappings. 
 Violence in Colombia is present and prevalent beyond the guerilla groups, both 
the government and the paramilitaries have histories of violence and human rights 
violations.  In the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2010, the section designated to 
the guerilla groups, FARC and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation 
Army, ELN) is significantly shorter than the sections allotted for paramilitary and 
government violations.  The violations listed for the FARC are massacres, killings, 
threats, and recruitment of child combatants as well as the use of landmines.  The FARC-
EP has been responsible for massacres and abuses against the Afro-Colombian and 
Indigenous populations.15  Though the FARC-EP’s violations are unacceptable, in 
comparison with competing forces their misconduct in actuality is at least contextualized. 
The report notes that, on the other hand, the violations of the paramilitaries involve drug 
trafficking, active recruitment, and various abuses, including: massacres, killings, rapes, 
threats, and forced displacement as well as attacks against union workers.16  Furthermore, 
the past years have shown an increase in the amount of extrajudicial killings of civilians 
attributed to the Colombian army.  “Army members, under pressure to show results, kill 
civilians and then report them as combatants killed in action.”17 
                                                 
14 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 32. 
15 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 212. 
16 Human Rights Watch, 213. 
17 Human Rights Watch, 214. 
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According to Adam Isacson, Director of Programs and Latin American specialist 
at the Center for International Policy, in the late nineties there was a dramatic shift in the 
percentage of murders in Colombia, as the AUC was created in 1997.  About seventy per 
cent of the murders are attributed to the right-wing paramilitaries while the FARC-EP 
was responsible for less than a quarter, leaving the government with a designated five per 
cent.18  Before the formation of the paramilitaries, the FARC-EP and the government 
were equally responsible.  This change in numbers establishes a clear connection between 
the paramilitaries and the Colombian governments.  The paramilitaries took over the 
unethical and violent role in which the government would otherwise partake.19  The 
diminishing government abuses allude to the development of the paramilitaries as a 
scapegoat for Colombian administrations.  Accusations against Colombian congressmen 
and their connections with the paramilitaries have risen.  In 2006, the investigations of 
more than eighty members of the Congress commenced due to these accusations 
involving government collaboration with the AUC.  These investigations and accusations 
are known as the parapolitics scandal.  However, “the Uribe administration has 
repeatedly taken actions that could sabotage the investigations, including issuing public 
and personal attacks against Supreme Court justices.”20  
 The violence and the strength of the paramilitaries coupled with that of the 
government brings forth the rationalization that the FARC-EP has taken to violent means 
in order to compete with these opposing forces.  They, the Leftist guerillas, have also 
consequently deepened their connections with the drug trade because of the 
                                                 
18 Isacson phone interview, Jan. 20, 2011.  
19 Plan Colombia: Cashing in on the Drug War Failure, DVD, directed by Gerard Ungerman and Audrey 
Brohy (2002; Cinema Libre). 
20 Human Rights Watch, 213. 
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paramilitaries’ increasing and intense association of their own.  The disappearance of the 
Medellín and Cali cartels, the two main and most powerful cartels of the 1970s and 80s in 
Colombia, opened the FARC-EP and the AUC to association with the drug industry in 
the mid 1990s.21 
 
Support and Structure of the FARC-EP 
 The FARC-EP is portrayed in negative light by the United States and Colombia, 
and although the FARC-EP is present on the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s list 
of international terrorist organizations, there is little information and analysis provided on 
the highly dangerous terrorist group.   
The guerilla group is oddly one of the world’s least researched politico-military 
organizations.  As no in-depth scholarship has been conducted on the FARC-EP’s 
ideological or practical relation to contemporary social change, there is much 
need for such study.”22  
 
More importantly, there is evidence that the guerilla group has provided aid to its 
supporters and it has increasing amounts of followers especially seen in the mid 1990s to 
the mid 2000s.  Peasant support grew steadily throughout the mid 1960s and 70s, but the 
1980s brought more significant growth as roughly one fifth of the country gave his or her 
support to the organization.  The guerillas expanded their control to more than sixty per 
cent of the country with tangible influence in 622 municipalities, and by the end of the 
decade, their influence had reached 1,000 municipalities;23 in a few short years, ninety-
three per cent of all areas had guerilla presence.  The insurgency reached its peak in the 
                                                 
21 Arlene B. Tickner, “Colombia and the Unites States: From Counternarcotics to Counterterrorism,” 
2003, in Thomas J. Badey, ed., Violence and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2009), 
69. 
22 James Petras Preface to Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: the Origin and Direction of the 
FARC-EP (London: Pluto, 2010), xv. 
23 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 16 
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late 1990s to the early to mid 2000s.  As Isacson noted in an interview, it is difficult to 
know for sure how much support for insurgency exists.  Calculations published in 
Brittain’s Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia affirm that in 2002 the FARC-EP 
had more than 25,000 fighters, 24 where as the BBC reported that in 2002 the guerilla 
group consisted of 16,000 troops.25  Perhaps a greater contrast comes in Brittain’s 
estimation that in 2008 the FARC was comprised of nearly 35,000 combatants, 26 
whereas both Isacson and the BBC believe that a more realistic number of current 
combatants is around 8,000.27  Brittain acknowledges the difference; he realizes that
number [40,000-50,000] may appear high when compared with popular media accounts 
and state sources, but it must be understood that the FARC-EP remained 
disproportionately underrepresented for the greater part of the previou
 “this 
s two decades.”28 
ort.  
                                                
The diminishing numbers of the FARC-EP came primarily during the Uribe 
administration as his father was killed by the guerillas.  His personal vendetta against the 
insurgency fueled his policymaking as he increased military action towards the 
insurgents.29  The FARC-EP’s growth of the past fifteen years can be “attributed to 
continued political and economic repression of the rural population and urban working 
poor.”30  This suggests that if the government does not recognize the legitimate call of 
the organization, then, combined with the insurgent’s will, the group will not cease to 
fight and will continue to find supp
 
24 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 20 
25 “Colombia Hostage Release: Breakthrough for Peace?,” British Broadcasting Corporation, Feb. 17, 2011 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-latin-america-12491339) 
26 Isacson phone interview, Jan. 20, 2011. 
27 BBC, Feb. 17, 2011. 
28 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 19. 
29 BBC, Feb. 17, 2011. 
30 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 19. 
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The combatants are spread throughout Colombia based on the need from certain 
blocs.  The largest blocs are the Southern and Eastern blocs.  Blocs in central coffee-
growing region, the Magdalena medio region, Antioquia and Caribbean have departments 
fewer members because they have had to contend with the strengths of paramilitaries for 
more than twenty years.31   
 
32 
Structurally, the FARC-EP consists of seven blocs, in which each has a number of fronts, 
on average 300 to 600 combatants per unit.  By 2002, it was generally conceded that 105 
                                                 
31 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 21. 
32 The Center for International Policy, Colombia Program http://www.cipcol.org/?p=601, (May, 28, 2008). 
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fronts exist throughout the country.33  As of the late 1990s, the organization controlled 
622 municipalities and there is a rigid hierarchy spread from the High Command of the 
seven-person-secretariat, to the soldiers.34  Within their controlled territory, the FARC-
EP recruits, maintains camps, develops the land for infrastructure and houses a regular 
army.35 
According to Isacson, the strong blocs operate in more remote and unpopulated 
regions of triple canopy jungles, which allows a separation from the government, and the 
populations consist of many rural and peasant people who will follow the FARC-EP.36  
“The guerillas did not represent or fight for the masses, but the insurgency was the 
masses.”37  The transformation into the people’s army in 1982 further emphasizes the 
important and basic connection that the organization instinctively holds to the masses. 
Thus, their goals will persist beyond the ridicule and libel of the media, U.S. influence 
and the Colombian government.  Furthermore, the insurgency has had to withstand the 
billions of dollars and aid that the United States has funneled into the Colombian 
government to combat the supposed “terrorists” or “narco-traffickers.”  Yet, while U.S. 
and Colombian time, money and resources are geared towards the guerillas, the 
paramilitaries see little of the aggression.  
                                                 
33 James J. Brittain, "Columbia’s FARC–EP Defies Imperialist Expansion,” An Independent Socialist 
Magazine - Monthly Review, Nov. 26, 2010 (http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm). 
34 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 16. 
35 Chaliand and Blin, 24. 
36 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 21. 
37 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 31. 
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38 
 In an interview between Leech and Josh Rushing, a reporter for Al Jezeera, the 
two discuss the term narco-guerillas and narco-terrorists.  Leech mentions that the latter 
became more commonly used after 9/11 and Rushing comments that “the use of that 
word terrorist [can be traced] to 9/11 and [it is interesting to] then see how it is used for 
politics and money afterwards.”    Leech says, now, due to the War on Terror, 
congressional approval is easy to come by when terrorism mentioned, which encapsulates 
the idea that the term “terrorism” has lost meaning and become solely a political 
mechanism to reduce non-state oppositional powers around the globe.  Leech adds that 
Plan Colombia is seemingly more of a counter-insurgency plan rather than a counter-
narcotics scheme.   The FARC-EP cannot be grouped with other terrorist groups 
because they have “put forth a series of fundamental socio economic reforms and worked 
to aid the masses for whom they stand and fight.41   
                                                
39
40
 
38 “Colombia’s War without and End,” BBC 
our_own_correspondent/1849603.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_  (Mar. 2, 2002). 
39 After Words with Garry Leech. 
40 After Words with Garry Leech. 
41 Petras and Brescia, 135. 
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In 2006, it was made known the FARC-EP had been providing medical services 
infirmaries capable of supplying surgic
42
in some of the most impoverished slums of Colombia.  The guerillas had created 
al operations, medicine and health care 
supplies to local civilians.    
that Mo f the FARC-EP’s most progressive social and 
econom  
e 
es 
e 
political force in South America opposing imperialism’ (Escribano, 2003:299), 
P as the hemisphere’s most dangerous 
terrorist organization.   
 
 
he Geography and History of Violence 
The fall of the Soviet Union, and thus the elimination of foreign aid, coupled 
y powers as well as the U.S.-aided Colombian 
military pushed the FARC-EP towards more violent and harmful actions.  They began to 
           
 
Leech wrote after the death of Jorge Briceño Suárez, who went by Mono Jojoy, 
no Jojoy implemented some o
ic policies in order to aid peasants in the rural regions of Colombia.  Many of the
small towns under Mono Jojoy’s control were also subject to significant infrastructur
improvements due to the guerillas’ public works programs, such as road construction 
between dozens of rural towns.  Furthermore, with the aid of FARC-EP’s tax revenue, 
Mono Jojoy was able to construct electrical grids in dozens of remote towns and villag
that would be otherwise neglected by the national government while he also oversaw th
redistribution of land to subsistence farmers as a result of agrarian reforms.43  However, 
many of these reforms, movements and projects are overlooked and rarely 
commemorated by the government or the media.  
While it [the FARC-EP] can be described as ‘the most important military and 
Washington prefers to classify the FARC-E
44
T
 
with increasing pressures from paramilitar
                                      
42 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 29. 
43 Garry Leech, "The Significance of the Killing of FARC Leader ‘Mono Jojoy,’” Colombia Journal, Sept. 
24 2010, http://colombiajournal.org/the-significance-of-the-killing-of-farc-leader-mono-jojoy.htm. 
44 Petras, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, xv. 
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use land mines, gas-cylinder bombs, hijack commercial jets, assassinate elected official
murder peace activists, and they also attacked an upscale family recreation center in 
Bogotá killing and wounding many.
s, 
ts 
ia.  
re not 
s 
through the use of arms before they did through the exercise of the 
continuation of politics by other means.  
  The geographical diversity of Colombia is responsible for the creation, since its 
indepen gly different 
needs a bian Sociologist:  
parties, we [Colombians] never developed peaceful ways to resolve conflict.  If 
  
                                                
45  Such actions created means for the government 
and media to associate the insurgency with terrorism.  As a result, there have been 
reported links between the FARC-EP and other insurgencies-deemed-terrorist 
organization such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).46  Furthermore, these violent ac
can be contextualized through the investigation of the history of politics in Colomb
Political scientist, Harvey Kline, argues that peace and politics and Colombia a
commonly associated with one another.47  In the 19th century alone, Colombia was victim 
to eight civil wars, six of which were direct fights of political opposition: Liberals versu
Conservatives.48  Kline cites, Fabio Zambrano Pantoja as he said,  
The real people, that is to say, the majority of the population, learned politics 
suffrage…most people were applying the generalized idea that war is the 
49
  
dence, of a “political archipelago,” each region consists of increasin
nd lifestyles.50  Lastly, Kline cites a Colom
Probably because of the traditional, oligarchic set up of Liberal and Conservative 
we have disagreements we only think of violence as the way to solve them.”51 
 
45 Kline, 11. 
ess, “Global Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection,” Center for Defense Information 46 Mark Burg
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc-ira-pr.cfm (June 5, 2002). 
47 Kline, 8. 
48 Kline, 8. 
49 Kline, 8. 
50 Kline, 1. 
51 Kline, 9. 
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 Colomb
ly 
e 
 
ted 
e 
ence.  However, decades have 
enters.  
                                
Regardless of the innate urge towards violence that resonates throughout 
ia’s politics, four administrations since the 1982 administration of Belisario 
Betancur have taken part in Peace Talks with the, at that time, four guerilla groups 
present in the country.52  During the Betancur government, the FARC-EP was the on
insurgency that maintained the truce and cease-fire with the government.53  After th
failed Pastrana talks, the prospect of a peaceful outcome during the Uribe administration
was crushed.  However, due to the recent releases of six hostages, as of February 18, 
2011, there is speculation that peace talks could ensue between the insurgency and the 
Colombian government.54  Yet, while speculation circulates, President Santos was quo
by Colombia’s El Tiempo, “In addition to leaving behind terrorism and freeing all of th
kidnapped people, the guerillas should renounce narcotrafficking to even think of the 
possibility of dialogue.”55  It appears that Santos has pledged a similar tactic to Uribe in 
dealing with the guerillas and Colombia’s civil war. 
       In conclusion, the FARC-EP is a guerilla group working for social and 
economic equality with hopes of shared political pres
passed and they have yet to attain any power within the formidable Colombian 
government.  Thus, the methods of the organization have had to change with the times, 
which is partly seen through the rural-based movement’s expansion into urban c
Yet, while the organization still holds true to developmental ideals, as “many townsfolk 
enjoyed living in the rebel safe-haven because it provided a sense of security and the 
                 
52 Camilo P. González, "Negotiations with the FARC." Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/colombia/negotiations-farc.php (2004). 
53 Kline, 17. 
54 BBC, Feb. 17, 2011. 
55 “‘Con Estas Cinco Liberaciones No Basta,’” Anunció El Presidente Santos,” El Tiempo, Feb. 8, 2011 
(http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/santos-planteo-condiciones-para-siquiera-pensar-en-dialogo-con-
farc_8835801-4). (Feb 11, 2011). 
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ability to create alternative community-based development projects,”56 adaptation was 
necessary for survival.   
The insurgency began as a peasant led rural-based land struggle in the 1960s, bu
illustrating a visio
57
t 
it has since been transformed into a national political-military social movement 
n of alternative development through socialist society via armed 
struggle.  
 m 
the leftist guerilla group as it began in 1964 (to be rightfully founded in 1966) to being 
s.  
ocial 
 
 
ally, 
                                                
 
 Subsequent chapters will examine how, and why the FARC has transformed fro
portrayed as a “terrorist organization” involved in drug production as it has been named 
through mass media, the United States and Colombian governments.  This thesis will 
look to uncover the accuracy or lack of accuracy of these accusations and depictions of 
the FARC-EP surfaced and advocated by the public media and hardline administration
It will also dissect the term terrorism and its connotations and meanings that have 
developed since its inception during the French Revolution.  The hope of this research is 
to argue that the FARC-EP has maintained its ideology and continues to fight for s
equality within Colombia and that the label of a “terrorist organization” is not justifiable. 
 As demonstrated predominantly by Leech, Petras and Brittain “rather than blindly
following the rhetoric of [so-called] ‘experts,’ the mass media, or state-based reports,” 
the research and production of this thesis will investigate and promote discussion of the 
actions, ideologies and the accomplishments of the guerilla group.58  Research will 
attempt to negate the insinuations that the insurgency has “failed to retain ‘an ideological
vision’ of political organization or the expansion of class consciousness.”59  Essenti
the argument will be made that drugs and crime are just means to an end for the FARC-
 
56 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 31. 
 
57 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 30. 
58 Petras, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, xv. 
59 Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 90.
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EP.  Such means have become necessary in order to uphold and maintain power in their 
struggle against neoliberal governments that have for decades ignored the rural 
populations and communities outside of Bogotá.  These marginalized regions have seen 
little accommodation from the differing Colombian administrations.  Instead, the
government partakes in the violence and refuses to negotiate and compromise with the 
FARC-EP and their visions.  
 The first step towards understanding the complex situation of the FARC-EP lies
in the historical development 
 
 
of the organization.  A historical context of the insurgency 
lustra
ower 
 
the FARC.  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Violent Past and Present of Colombia 
il tes the political, social and economic standings and systems entrenched in 
Colombia since colonial rule.  Independence in Colombia from Spain did not result in 
liberation and equality for all, as it rarely does.  Instead, independence meant the p
of the few wealthy, landowners and centuries of Liberal and Conservative power.  This
combination resulted in erupted violence and grave socio-economic inequality.  As the 
gap between the rich and the poor grew along with abuse and bloodshed, the 
marginalized persons of the countryside, driven by hope for change, rationalized and 
formed Leftist guerilla groups, which would result in the eventual creation of 
Centuries of struggle and violence serve only as the pretext to the almost fifty year 
struggle of the peasant-influenced guerilla insurgency.  The subsequent chapter will 
introduce the many aspects and obstacles that the insurgency now faces.  
 
 
 
 17
 In order to understand the cause and fight of the FARC, the social, economic and 
political ci
ncovered.  This chapter will reveal the immense inequality and violence that has 
he 
mbian 
d 
gional or local conflicts.60  The source of much of the violence resonates 
t s.  
 
o avail.  
rty 
                                                
rcumstances of the country during the insurgency’s inception will be 
u
plagued Colombia since colonization and into its independence.  Without such context, 
the goals and justification of the guerilla army would be lost and unimportant.  T
FARC almost fifty years old.   The organization has contended with dozens of Colo
administrations and inevitably social, economic and political changes.  The insurgency 
has evolved accordingly, and it has likewise encountered present-day enemies and 
opposition.   
 The history of Colombia is a violent, turbulent story.  In the 19th century alone, 
after Colombia’s declared independence in 1810, there were numerous civil wars an
nearly fifty re
with the life-long conflict between the political parties of the Conserva ives and Liberal
In 1899, in connection with the U.S. backed fight for Panamanian independence, 
Colombia began the Thousand Days War.  The inevitable civil war between the dueling
factions persisted until 1902 resulting in the deaths of thousands of citizens and the 
secession of Panama; it devastated the country with its ideological battles but to n
The same war and tensions between the parties broke out in violence again decades later 
in the period known as La Violencia, which left 200,000-300,000 people dead.  
Additionally, lives in Colombia have been further sacrificed due to the current internal 
war between the Leftist guerillas, paramilitaries and government’s armed forces.  As 
Daniel Peacaut, a well-known French student of Colombia’s violence, notes, “pa
 
60 Cristina Rojas and Michael J. Shapiro, Civilization and Violence: Regimes of Representation in 
Nineteenth-Century Colombia (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 19.  
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identification overwhelmed any other social division…therefore, violence is linked to th
autonomy of politics.”
e 
the 
ces 
the dysfunction of peasant life, to the destruction of social, moral and economic 
ority of 
the population into fanatic bands, whose only hope of survival consisted in 
 the domination of one 
‘party’ over the other.”  
Brief C
The roo nt, 
a recog n and explanation are developed in order to place the FARC in existence with 
at drove Colombia to violence and decades of internal conflict. 
rupted between the followers of Bolívar and Santander are consequently 
responsible for the creation of the separation and struggle between the Colombian Liberal 
                                                
61  Violence has plagued Colombia due to the colonization and 
implementation of the oligarchy, distribution of wealth, severe geographical differen
throughout the country and the ongoing political opposition.  To quote notable 
Colombian author and professor, Fernando Guillén Martínez: 
The civil wars of the nineteenth century contributed, more than anything else, to 
importance of the smaller urban centers and to the conversion of the maj
vanquishing the enemy on the national scale, imposing
62
 
 
olonial History 
ts of Colombian society are based on inequality and violence and so at this poi
nitio
the conflicting factors th
Moreover, Colombia never experienced a new process of state formation after its 
independence from Spain, and in consequence, Colombia had a weak central government 
and much of the power remained in the hands of the elite classes forming an oligarchic 
democracy.63 
After Independence from Spain, Simón Bolívar was elected as President of Gran 
Colombia in 1819; Francisco de Paula Santander became his vice president.  The 
conflicts that e
 
61 Rojas and Shapiro, 20. 
62 Norman A. Bailey, “La Violencia in Colombia,” Journal or Inter-American Studies 9:4 (1967), 
(http://www.jstor.org), 572. 
63 W. John Green, Gaitanismo, Left Liberalism, and Popular Mobilization in Colombia (Florida: University 
Press of Florida, 2003), 8. 
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and Co
tholic 
se 
ge 
rnmental 
rs 
 1850s.69  Coffee as an economic entity coupled with Spanish 
ces 
ion 
nservative parties.64   Bolivar’s supporters later came to form the Conservative 
Party, which sought a strong, centralized government, alliance with the Roman Ca
Church and limited franchise.65  Conservatives also encourage rural development becau
it sees property as a natural right and it is believed that the state should protect 
landowners and thus favor taxation on uncultivated land rather than parcelization of lar
territories and estates.66  Followers of Santander created the Liberal Party, which wanted 
a decentralized government, state control over education and other civil matters as well as 
inclusive suffrage.67   It is the party of the people; it favors the decrease of gove
restriction on trade and pushes for a greater role in meeting the individuals social and 
economic needs.68  
 Colombia began as an export economy based on agriculture.  Coffee, tobacco, 
cotton and cocao production began to surface and flourish in plantations on the western 
slope of the Cordillera Oriental toward the Magdalena River by the European colonize
predominantly in the
colonization and the power of the oligarchy in Colombia serve to be the underlying for
responsible for the political situation and context in existence today.  Charles Bergquist, 
Professor Emeritus at the University of Washington wrote, in Colombia, “economic 
resources were monopolized by a small upper class interested in preserving its posit
and generally unable or unwilling to generate new wealth.”70  Colonization and the 
                                                 
64 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. 
65 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. 
ll Town in a Developing Society (Illinois: Waveland Press, 
. 
uist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
66 Miles Richardson, San Pedro, Colombia: Sma
Inc., 1970), 17. 
67 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. 
68 Richardson, 17
69 Richardson, 7. 
70 Charles W. Bergq
Press, 1978), 3. 
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wealth that remained in the hands of a few consequently led to discrimination and 
favoring of the city people over the countryside; today, the issue of Bogotá as separate 
from the rest of the country remains a rampant and important issue.  Bogotá was one
the early settlements of the Spanish; it eventually became the political and cultural 
of the colony of New Granada.  In addition, after Colombia’s independence, the city 
became the capital and remains the “residential base of the country’s governmental 
apparatus and the home of its intellectuals.”
 of 
center 
ts and figures such as Lázaro Cárdenas of 
exico (1934-40), Juan Perón of Argentina (1946-55), Getúlio Vargas of Brazil (1930-
iécer Gaitán of Colombia emerged as a new political force 
through
e 
eir 
71  
 
Latin American Populism 
In the 1930s-1950s populist governmen
M
45 & 1950-54) and Jorge El
out Latin America.   This twentieth century populism varied from nineteenth 
century European populism in that it emerged from and combined with the activists of th
working-class, socialists, and social democratic mass movements.72 Populism inspired 
mobilization of the formerly passive and oppressed groups to take part in and voice th
positions to the political establishment.  Historian Eric Hobsbawm stated: “European 
fascist regimes destroyed labour movements, the Latin American leaders inspired and 
created them.”73  The connection with these more leftist organizations and movements 
influenced these leaders, Cárdenas, Perón, Vargas and Gaitán, who never associated 
                                                 
71 Richardson, 6. 
e, A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present (Chichester:U.K.: John Wiley 72 Teresa A. Mead
& Sons Ltd., 2010), 195. 
73 Meade, 195. 
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themselves with trade unions, socialists or leftist ideals, to address more common social
and mass movement issues.  As a result,  
Their populist influence relied on the mass base that had been forged in the battle
communist leaders; and relied on t
74
 
 
for workers’ rights; matured under the tutelage of socialist, anarchist, or 
he organizational apparatus of left-leaning 
political parties.”  
Howev asses, in 
many cases, populist leaders articulated a progressive rhetoric, while actually 
ed 
chine 
o 
t-
f the 
                                                
 
er, while the leaders seemingly took a public role to address and aid the m
undermining the interests of the masses, and ultimately strengthened capitalism and upper 
class goals.75  Though the masses, meaning the middle class, typically support
populism, it, unlike socialism, encourages and embraces capitalism and does not advocate 
for a worker-run state.  “Populists use the strength of the state…as a patronage ma
to appease workers and meet the demands of mass movements.”76   Populism creates a 
supportive façade to the masses, yet at the same time the policies that are implemented d
not necessarily reflect the presidential mantras.  Populism gradually emerged in Latin 
America, in the 1930s, after the vast majority of the countries began to move away from 
agricultural and export economies.  They began to internalize and move towards impor
substitution industrialization.77  Although it would appear that the separation from 
agricultural economy would create new political powers, the elite classes remained in 
power for the most part, even with the appearance of populism and the emergence o
masses.78  The “genius” of populism is its ability to manipulate the different classes in 
order to appeal and appease to each of them.        
 
5. 
74 Meade, 195. 
75 Green, 3. 
76 Meade, 19
77 Green, 2. 
78 Green, 3. 
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Typically, characterization of Latin American populism includes an urban settin
a range of socio-economic support, a connection t
g, 
o nationalism, and a charismatic 
leader.7
”80  It 
e the 
 
 
Notably, Colombia has not had a successful revolution nor a real movement 
sest actions may be those of the FARC guerillas.  Colombia is in 
much n  in 
na 
 
 
                               
9  Steve Stein, a professor, portrays “populism’s ‘central dynamic’ as the 
personalistic particularistic ties between powerful leaders and dependent followers.
seems that the populist leaders use the faithful followers in order to achieve outsid
goals of the masses.  As Brazilian Antonio Carlos Riberiro de Andrada stated in 1930, 
“Facamos a revolucão antes que o povo a faca” (We will make the revolution before the
people do).81  This daunting statement implies that populist governments worked to 
control the revolution through political influence and charismatic leaders.  Furthermore, 
Stein suggests that, “populism was the primary reason why ‘the expected build up of
popular pressures for revolutionary change has not occurred.’”82  
 
Banana Massacre 
towards one; the clo
eed of a revolution and the guerillas fight for many of the same issues present
other Latin American countries (i.e. land reform and distribution of wealth).  The Bana
Massacre of 1928 is an event that encapsulated revolutionary ideas and demonstrates the
masses unrest and desire for change.  In the department of Magdalena, on December 6, 
1928, United Fruit Company’s workers staged a strike in the train station of Ciénaga. 
Thousands of banana workers gathered to demonstrate in hopes of improving living and
                  
79 Green, 2. 
 
81 Green, 4. 
82 Green, 4. 
 23
working conditions as well as to see negotiations.  However, in return the Conservativ
government’s troops fired at the protesters and their families killing hundreds.
e 
 
 as 
he 
aitán 
ppeal to 
ughout the country.  His populist rhetoric permeated 
Colomb
n 
                                                
83  The 
United Fruit Company is a U.S.-owned corporation; it essentially created debt peonage. 
The banana workers, bananeros, were “independent workers” forced to sell their crop
rent for the company land while they were paid in script only redeemable in company 
stores.84  Labor abuses were abundantly visible, so, anarcho-syndicalists and the Partido 
Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party, PSR) organized to confront t
company that had for years abused the workers’ rights.  After the massacre, the conflict 
and battle returned to the Conservative and the Liberals.  Gaitán used this banana 
massacre in order create a strong reputation with the Liberal Party.85  In 1929 he headed 
to Ciénago to initiate an investigation into what happened on December 6, 1928.  G
used the incident to campaign and confronted the people’s frustration with “the 
domination of the gringos.”86  
Gaitán, the charismatic leader, used the Banana Massacre as a crutch to a
the masses and win support thro
ia and consequently his death left populism and faith in politics dead as well.  
The death of Gaitán drove Bogotá and other cities in rubble and parish, and “the natio
plunge[d] into seemingly eternal bloody strife.”87 
 
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 
 
83 Green, 26. 
84 Green, 60. 
85 Meade, 180. 
86 Green, 62. 
87 Green, 1. 
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 Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was born in 1903 to a respectable lower class family in 
olomb
eputy 
ver, in 
mbia.  He conveniently 
structur
sm.  
 and 
ugh not a socialist, he used the language of socialism to advocate for a more 
humane capitalism in which the government intervened to ensure an equitable 
                                                
C ia.  Yet, he worked his way into elite political circles and into the heart of 
Colombian society; he served as Bogotá city councilman, departmental assembly d
for Cundinamarca, mayor of Bogotá, congressman, senator, cabinet minister, Education 
Minister, Labor Minister and became a primary presidential candidate.88  After the 
United Fruit Company’s Banana Massacre, Gaitán split from the Liberal party.89  In 
response, in 1933, he created his own political movement, the Unión Nacional 
Izquierdista Revolucionaria (National Leftist Revolution Union, UNIR).  Howe
subsequent years, in 1947, he became the jefe único of the Liberal Party.90  
Gaitán gained respect and praise from the masses in Colo
ed his image to reflect both his progressive political values and his aspirations of 
aiding the poor; he dictated a path to change and thus became the defense and voice of 
the pueblo as he bridged the gap between classes.91  The movement that followed 
Gaitán’s prominence, Gaitanismo, has seemingly undeniable connections to populi
Gaitanismo included members of the capital-owning, commercial, and professional 
classes, the political elite, and even rural small holders and landless agrarian workers
artisans.92   
Altho
distribution of wealth, public education, a decent standard of living and that the 
benefits of modern society were available to everyone.93   
 
 
88 Green, 1. 
89 Meade, 195. 
90 Green, 1. 
91 Meade, 204. 
92 Green, 9. 
93 Meade, 205. 
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Gaitán can be praised for his inclusion because it covers the social and political spectrum 
of Colombia. 
The misguided speech and representation produced by the Machiavellian, populist 
leaders created an atmosphere of united support seen from all different socio-economic 
classes, thus the popularity and dedication particular to the populist leaders was immense.  
Specifically, the assassination of Gaitán served as a catalyst to riots, violence, revolution 
and social movements.  The masses of Colombia took to the streets in rage and rebellion 
in reaction to the respected candidate’s death.  Gaitán was assassinated on April 9, 1948, 
by Juan Roa Suierra, a day that changed dramatically the path of Colombia and pushed 
the country into decades of violence and civil war.  Immediately following Gaitán’s 
death, the assassin was apprehended and killed by outraged Colombians.  Riots were 
instigated, and Liberals and Conservatives took to the streets of Bogotá.  The events 
nearly completely destroyed the city, the rampage is known as El Bogotzao.   The fight 
spread to the countryside where the period known as La Violence emerged and continued 
for more than a decade.  The riots in Bogotá, following Gaitán’s assassination, led to 
peasant land seizures in rural areas, which resulted in severe repression from land 
owners; they then hired thugs to force the farmers off of the apprehended territories.  
These peasants in turn formed guerrilla armies.   The death of Gaitán,  
Brought an end to Colombia’s longest period of peaceful political development, 
s 
La Violencia 
                                                
94
95
swept away much of the legitimacy of its political class, and completely altered it
political environment for decades to come.96 
 
 
 
 
94 Meade, 205. 
95 Meade, 205. 
96 Green, 261. 
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 La Violencia began in the subsequent months after the death of Gaitán and the 
he 
he 
form 
e 
 
to 
ant desire 
7 
                                                
break out of riots in Bogotá and the countryside: El Bogotazo.  The primary source of t
violence resonated with the Liberals and the Conservatives.  The Liberals had previously 
held political power for sixteen years, until the power was transferred from Alberto 
Lleras Camargo to the new Conservative leader, Mariano Ospina Pérez in 1946.97  T
1948 assassination of Gaitán sparked speculation between the parties.  Soon, the 
Conservatives, in power, reorganized both urban and rural police in hopes to trans
Colombia.  The violence that erupted was atrocious and unfathomable especially as thes
acts were committed against fellow citizens.  For example, common torture methods 
consisted of “picar para tamal,” which meant to cut up the living victim into small 
pieces as well as crucifixion, hanging, pushing victims from airplanes (later utilized 
during dictatorships in Argentina), children were raped and most disturbingly, some 
pregnant victims were given caesarian sections only to have their babies removed and
replaced by roosters.98  In order to combat such horrors, the Leftist guerilla movement 
grew and conceptualized.  In 1953, the dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla granted amnesty 
the guerilla fighters in the countryside.  Many conceded to the request, but at the same 
time those that remained entrenched in the fight created “soviet republics” like that of 
Sumapz and Marquetalia, which were areas governed by rebel peasants in the 
countryside.99  Two years later, in 1955, the rebel republics remained and peas
to continue the fight raged, but the Conservatives and Liberals were on the road to 
reconciliation with hopes to end the violence.  This violence officially ended in 195
 
97 Bailey, 567. 
98 Bailey, 563. 
99 Bailey 567. 
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when Liberals and Conservatives signed a pact to divide political power in order to 
establish national unity.100    
Although the political parties subsided, these “soviet republics” in the countryside 
raged.  Peasants were initially involved in the bloody battle due to the ever-present 
political and economic battles between the Liberals and Conservatives, however, in the 
end, peasants decided to take their own role in altering the political future of their 
country.  La Violencia weakened political support in both the masses and the elite, while 
it stimulated class consciousness.101  The resulting peasant “soviet republics” led to the 
1960s creation and organization of guerilla groups.  “The Marxist have decided that La 
Violencia represents the rebellion of the downtrodden masses against the oligarchs—in 
other words, the class struggle.”102  Though the violence emerged as a conflict and fight 
between Colombia’s political parties, it resulted in a transformation and presence of 
peasant politics.    
 
Marquetalia Republica 
In the years following Gaitán’s assassination, radical Liberals as well as 
communist guerillas joined to form the Marquetalia Republic.  This cooperation of 
Leftist idealist coupled with the assassination of Gaitán and the break out of El Bogotazo 
is essentially the catalyst to the eventual creation of the FARC.  In an interview with a 
FARC-EP’s spokesperson, Marco Leon Calarca, FightBack!News uncovers the specific 
governmental actions that preceded the establishment of the guerilla group.  Calarca 
credits the Colombian military’s plan, in cooperation with the U.S. pentagon, Latin 
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American Security Operation (LASO) or Operation Marquetalia as the event that initiated 
the formation of the Leftist insurgency.103  On May 27, 1964, commanders Joselo and 
Isaias Pardo led the Leftist guerillas into battle to defend their republic from the 
governmental oppression based on LASO.  To the guerillas of the republic, these actions 
of the U.S. supported Colombian government rationalized the formation of the FARC.104  
As a result of the conflict, on July 20, 1964 the guerillas set forth an agricultural program 
and concocted a fighting strategy.  Officially, on May 5, 1966, at the Second Conference 
of the Southern Bloc, the FARC was conceptualized and formalized.105  The FARC-EP 
spokesperson details that after the government’s attacks on the republic, the guerillas and 
rural farmers discussed the future and cause of the organization. 
We all are revolutionaries who fight for a change of the system. But we wanted 
and struggled for this change using the least painful path for our people: the 
peaceful road, the road of democratic mass struggle, legal roads marked out in the 
Colombian Constitution. This path was violently closed to us. Because we are 
revolutionaries, who must in one way or another, play the historic role that falls to 
us. Forced by the circumstances that I already noted, we are inspired to look for 
another path: the road of the armed revolutionary struggle for power.106 
 
In the end, these campesinos and farmers felt objectified by the government and sought 
the next viable option in order to protect their land, lives and rights.  They believe that the 
violent actions brought on by the government vindicate the guerilla formation based on 
military tactics of the FARC.  
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Marulanda and the Creation of the FARC 
The aforementioned creation of the Marquetalia Republic served as the incubator 
to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the insurgents.  From this influential environment, 
Manuel Marulanda Vélez, also known as Tirofijo, and Jacobo Arenas emerged as the 
founders of the Leftist guerilla group, the FARC.  The reason for the formation of the 
insurgency remains consistent with the initial goals developed and pursued by the 
Republic.  To aid the countryside as it suffered from the lack of land reform, increased 
violence and discrimination and the constraints of the Conservative party of 1946. 
 Though both Arenas and Marulanda are credited as the founding figures of the 
FARC, Marulanda is more commonly associated with FARC leadership; he was the 
Commander in Chief until his death in 2008.  Marulanda was of peasant upbringing, a 
lower-level employee in public works.107  By his twenties, Marulanda developed clear 
association with Marxism-Leninism and abandoned social-democratic ideology.108  
Later, he became associated principally with communism and became a member of the 
Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC).  People mistakenly connect him to the Liberals 
because he was born in a rural peasant area where he was influenced by the Libe
Conservative struggle as he lived through La Violencia.
ral and 
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emphasizes, the origins of the FARC are heavily and almost completely intertwined with 
the beliefs and ideologies of the PCC and some say radical Liberalism.110  In the 1930s 
the PCC originally called for “social transformation, unionism and the education of the 
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working class”111 while also working for better living and working conditions, thus they 
found the majority of their support in rural areas, coffee regions, among landless peasants 
and farmers and later the urban working class.112 
The aim of the insurgency and the countryside’s Leftist guerillas from the 
beginning was not to militarize and coerce, but rather initiate reform and establish a 
governing “coalition with other progressive parties and movements in a multiparty 
system in which the centerpiece of socio economic policy will be the equitable 
redistribution of wealth and resources.”113  The FARC gained their support through, 
redistribution of land, which called for agrarian reform, their call for nationalism, which 
meant opposition to foreign control, their fight for democratization and thus a call to the 
end of Liberal-Conservative monopoly of political power and their devotion to 
dismantling of the oligarch’s control of the country.114 
This meant, as consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideals, that the organization 
automatically set itself up against the foreign power of the United States, which during 
the sixties and seventies was already exerting much influence within Latin America.  Yet, 
despite the strength and influence of neoliberal regimes and their U.S. backers, the 
insurgency has maintained its own strength and continued to grow throughout the 
decades to become the strongest and largest guerilla group in the Western Hemisphere.115   
 
FARC-EP Leadership and Structure 
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 Since the inception of the FARC, over the past 45 years of armed conflict with the 
Colombian government, only three of the guerilla group’s seven-person Secretariado 
have been killed.  Luis Edgar Devia Silva, who goes by the nom de guerre, Raúl Reyes, 
died during combat with Colombian Police in Putumayo region near Ecuador on March 
1, 2008.  José Juvenal Valandia, known as Manuel Jesús Muñoz Ortiz or by his nom de 
guerre, Ivan Ríos was killed March 7, 2008 and Víctor Julio Suárz Rojas, known more 
commonly as Jorge Briceño Suárez or Mono Jojoy, who joined the FARC at age twelve 
to later “commanded the rebel group’s largest bloc, which consists of forty per cent of it 
fighters,” was killed September 23, 2010.116  Founder and leader of the FARC, Manuel 
Marulanda Vélez, Tirofijo, also recently passed away on March 28, 2008 due to natural 
causes along with two other members of the Secretariado.  The few deaths since the 
creation of the FARC has allowed for the continuation of the insurgencies original goals 
to persist ideologically even though the situation that encompasses the violence has 
modernized.  
 The FARC-EP has complied with Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions, 
“which stipulate that oppositional armed movements vying for state power must formally 
arrange themselves into a visible ranked military construct.”117  Thus, the FARC-EP has 
a very rigid hierarchal system, however, the divisions of power and position do not 
prohibit the members from intercommunication.  According to Brittain, who spent time 
within the FARC-EP, “on a daily basis, the leadership talked with all members on a 
variety of issues ranging from camp structure to regional coordination.”118  The 
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organization is led by the Commander in Chief, who is currently Guillermo León Sá
Vargas, but goes by Alfonso Cano, who essentially holds all of the decision making 
power.  He is part of the Secretariado, which consists of seven high-level leaders who
finalize all tactical and political decisions as they consults and influence the Central 
Command.  The Central High Command, is made of commanders situated in the six 
blocs: Caribbean, Central, East, Middle Magdalena, South and West.  These six b
the most common; sources vary on the number of blocs and their names.  The bloc
divide Colombia into specific regions in order to ensure control and mobility througho
the country; each of these blocs is then populated by the fronts.  A front can have 
anywhere from 40-600 people in it depending on the size of the bloc and the location.  
Each bloc and all of the fronts maintain and update all of the information of each membe
and it is plentiful and accurate.
enz 
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119  Today, the Commander in Chief of the FARC-EP is 
Alfonso Cano.  The secretariat cons
Rodrigo “Timochenko” Londoño Echeverri, who goes by Timoleón Jiménez  
Luciano Marín Arango, Iván Márquez  
Milton “Usuriaga” de Jesús Toncel Redondo, Joaquín Gómez  
Jamie “El Médico” Alberto Parra, Mauricio Jaramillo  
Jorge Torres Victoria, Pablo Catatumbo  
Felix Antonio Muños Lascarro, Pasto Alape   
  
The FARC-EP has remained a prominent organization within the country with 
ample support for more then forty years due to the insurgency’s staunch devotion to their 
goals and ideologies because of the lack of command change in the secretariat.  Though 
the group has not yet been able to obtain their goals, dismantlement does not appear to be 
a fair or prospective outcome; they have for decades been working to promote their ideals 
and better the lives of their supporters.   
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The FARC-EP will not “negotiate its demobilization in return for reduced prison 
sentences as the paramilitaries have done. Nor will the guerillas demobilize in 
return for a full amnesty under a “peace” agreement that leaves the structures of 
neoliberalism intact.120   
 
Due to the FARC-EP’s infinite dedication to their originating goals and causes, it can be 
concluded that  “any negotiated peace would require a restructuring of Colombia’s 
political, social and economic system to ensure a much more equitable distribution of the 
country’s wealth and land.”121  However, Colombia’s dependence and affiliation based 
on monetary aid from the United States serves as the ultimate obstacle in the FARC-EP’s 
achievement of their institutional goals.  U.S. policy to eschew negotiations with 
terrorists coupled with the media’s depiction of the insurgency as a terrorist organization 
has created little hope for progress and compromise between the FARC-EP and 
Colombia’s government in the near future. 
The FARC began in the rural, forgotten and underrepresented areas of Colombia 
and has successfully been combating the national army.  The original fight between the 
Liberals and Conservatives as well as inequality and the strength of the oligarchy caused 
the construction of the rebel force as it remains today.  Guevara describes,  
A guerilla fighter as one who shares the longing of the people for liberation and 
who, once peaceful means are exhausted, initiates the fight and converts himself 
into an armed vanguard of the fighting people.  From the very beginning of the 
struggle he has the intention of destroying an unjust order and therefore an 
intention, more or less hidden, to replace the old with something new.122 
 
The FARC was created for this cause, violence spread through the countryside as the 
people’s needs continued to be denied.  A revolution of a sort was seen as the only way in 
which progress could be made and the marginalized and suppressed voices could be 
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heard.  The same powers and parties have ruled in Colombia since its creation, and after a 
decade of sheer violence, something new was indubitably the cure that Colombia needed 
to find.   
 
Conclusion 
 To conclude, the FARC emerged out of violence initiated by Colombia’s political 
parties of the ruling elite, yet the peasants and masses used the penetration of violence 
throughout the city and deep into the countryside as fuel to fight for change.  Similarly 
with nations around the globe, colonization has left developing nations in ruins, 
imbedded with weak, unstable governments.  In Colombia, power succeeded from Spain 
only to fall unto the wealthy landowners, who had little regard for rural farmers aside 
from their cultivation ability of economic commodities.  This disregard brought on by the 
oligarch created sentiments within the masses to seek separation from the constraints of 
Bogotá and the dueling powers of the Liberals and Conservatives.  Such violence and 
conflict present in Colombian politics serve to rationalize the Leftist peasants and 
guerillas’ creation and of the peoples’ army: an army established in the fight for equality. 
 The following chapter will discuss the aforementioned idea of United Sates’ 
influence in Colombia primarily in regards to the declaration of the insurgency as a 
“terrorist” organization.  The issue to be uncovered is how the term “terrorism” is 
discussed globally and whether or not the classification is justified.  Terrorism has been 
altered in past decades.  Substantial changes in tactic and ideology behind the military 
strategy have ensued and as a result the definition that accompanies current day 
“terrorism” has reached an over used and generalized explanation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Illusion of Terrorism and Misrepresented Guerilla 
Warfare 
 
 
 As the history of Colombia and the FARC demonstrated, there has not always 
been a connection between the insurgency and terrorism.  The connection is new and 
profound as it came as a result of the September 11 attacks against the United States.  
This section confronts the accusation against the decades-old insurgency as a new-age 
“terrorist” organization.  In addition, the falsified label of “terrorist” veers the public 
image of the FARC-EP to a negative route and also defers from the organizations original 
connection with guerilla warfare. 
 Terrorism originated in the midst of the French Revolution, however, it has 
undergone a rebirth and reconstruction in the years after September 11.  Today, the 
international community, but mainly the U.S. places the label on almost any organization 
that serves to question the status quo.  The overindulgence of the terminology has 
consequently diminished the power and meaning of the strategy.  This chapter examines 
the illegitimate notion of “terrorists” that the hard liner governments of Colombia and the 
United States have deemed unto the FARC-EP.   
 
Terrorists or Not? 
 
In recent years, the FARC-EP has adopted more violent roles to spread their cause 
in order to “upset the civilian economic and social life of [the] adversary state as to force 
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negotiations to more equal terms.”123  Furthermore, the insurgency has moved towards 
these aggressive methods in order to gain grounds against the corrupt Colombian 
administrations and the militarily trained and backed right-wing paramilitaries.  However, 
these tactics have consequently upset Colombian administrations and thus the United 
States’ government.  In return, the hard-liner governments and the media have 
strengthened the designation of the FARC-EP as a terrorist organization to further 
discredit the insurgency publicly.  The FARC-EP serves as a threat to these 
administrations because it “seeks to alter the status quo and shake complacent (dominant) 
populations or elites out of their complacency.  It threatens our comfortable and insulated 
everyday lives.”124  Furthermore, today, the connotation associated with terrorism vilifies 
a so-called “terrorist” organization beyond previous measures.  
There are two issues that surface in the argument to free the FARC-EP from the 
titles of “terrorists” and “narco-terrorists.”  The primary issue is the complex and 
disputed definition of what constitutes as “terrorism.”  The intricacy of the term has 
therefore denoted “terrorism” as an unproductive and controversial word that has been 
too politicized, used and redefined to hold any legitimate power in the world today.  
Secondly, the term has been embedded into global society and has consequently made it 
difficult to identify the contrast between terrorism and guerilla warfare. 
Generalities and assumptions fill the U.S. formulated criterion that justifies 
terrorist designations.  The Legal Criteria for Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations by the U.S. State Department reads as follows: 
1. It must be a foreign organization. 
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2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 
(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in 
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage 
in terrorist activity or terrorism. 
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the 
economic interests) of the United States.125 
 
Clauses such as the organization must “retain the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism” present on the Legal Criteria for Designation of terrorist 
organizations can potentially denote any group as a terrorist association due to the broad 
implications.  In addition to this arbitrary classification, the third point addressed under 
the Criteria reads, “the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the 
security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign 
relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.”  The insertion of the threat to 
“the economic interests of the United States” unravels the subject to be examined and 
analyzed in the subsequent chapter.   The section develops the idea that the U.S. 
government has named the guerillas “terrorists” in order to protect their oil interests held 
by Occidental Petroleum.  Furthermore, the resulting actions of U.S. taken to secure their 
economic interest have consequently and beneficially funneled money back into huge 
U.S. corporations such as Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporations and 
DynCorp.126    
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 History and Evolution of Terrorism 
 
The first issue to be addressed is the complexity of the term “terrorism.”  The 
matter can be discussed through examination of the history of the tactic.  It has become a 
broad category used to denounce opposition threats worldwide in order to strengthen the 
status quo and current powers.  Terrorism has transformed from its original establishment 
at the wake of the French Revolution in 1789 as a mechanism of terror used by the state 
against the masses, to being associated primarily with non-governmental groups fighting 
oppression.127  However, still, the main clauses in the definition of terrorism are (1) use 
of violence; (2) political objectives; (3) the intention of instilling fear in a target 
population.128  As further developed by Ariel Merari, a professor at Tel Aviv University, 
the broad definition of terrorism allows for a variety of different events to fall under the 
category of terrorism, which thus reduces the power behind the word.  Merari uses the 
United States’ bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945 as an example.  The 
acts were made of pure violence, encompassed with political ends and instilled fear in 
every Japanese citizen.  Yet, the term “terrorism” is more commonly associated with 
insurgent rather than state violence.129 
It is a moral fiction to draw a sharp distinction between resort to force by states 
and employment of force by subnational, including terrorist, groups.  Both cases 
bring death and entail the use of violence.  The chief distinction is a surface 
legitimacy to the state premised on little more than its greater longevity and 
organized control of territory.  Thus these varied actors—state and non-state—are 
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better judged and distinguished ultimately by the morality of their ends, not by a 
priori ‘status’.130 
 
While terrorism surfaced in the late 1700s, a substantial change in the actions 
associated with the mechanism of coercion came in 1878 with the Russian revolutionaries 
of “Narodnaya Volya.”  These revolutionaries used “terrorism” against political 
oppressors in order to surge a revolution of their own through the method of 
assassination.  Political assassination by means of terrorism continued to be the 
associated technique of terrorism for decades.  Eventually, this type of terrorism lead to 
the initial spark of World War I with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a 
Bosnian Serb student, Gavril Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.131  The next 
significant change in terrorism came in the years after World War II.  New targets 
emerged, policemen, local officials and, in some instances, civilians.  New tactics 
developed consisting of hostage-taking, aircraft hijackings and bombings of buildings.132  
The definition changed dramatically one last time with the actions of members of al 
Qaeda in the United States on September 11. 
The history of terrorism demonstrates the difficulties that arise in regards to the 
ability to distinguish groups as terrorist organizations or not.  The terminology is ever 
changing and no two groups are the same.  A plethora of organizations have developed to 
fight a number of different causes.  Also, as seen through the formation of the FARC-EP, 
the ideology behind the struggle and tactics of the organization is based on the 
fundamental desire for social equality.  Furthermore, Professor Adam Roberts, Professor 
Emeritus at Oxford University, writes that the common quote, “one man's terrorist is 
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another man's freedom fighter,” which reflects genuine doubts about the term.133  
Roberts further discusses the strife that contends with defining terrorism. 
                                                
The labeling of individuals and movements as 'terrorist' will remain complicated 
and highly political. Two key questions arise: (1) Is it reliance on terror that truly 
distinguishes a movement from its political opponents? (2) Even if parts of a 
movement have employed terrorist methods, is 'terrorist' an accurate description 
of the movement as a whole, made up of many different wings, and employing 
many different modes of action?134 
 
Roberts’ remark directly denounces the over use of the term terrorism and the excessive 
classification of opposition forces around the globe.  In today’s global society, 
“terrorism” has permeated foreign policy, specifically in the United States, in order to 
deter ideological foes and to protect economic investment, political relationships and 
global power.  
 
Terrorism: The New Communism 
As Europe crumbled in 1945 due to the exhaustion of war brought on by the 
various fascist regimes, the U.S. was able to sustain growth and prosperity because of its 
geographic location and hesitant entrance into the war.  Simultaneously, the Soviet Union 
emerged from the end of the war as a dueling superpower alongside the United States.  
The “two blocs represented the vanguard of radically opposing socio-economic and 
political systems, which both sides believed were destined to become globally 
universal.”135  These conflicting ideologies almost completely shaped U.S. foreign policy 
for the four decades following the close of World War II, the Cold War.   
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The United States spread its power and dominance, not solely to undermine 
Soviet influence, but to pressure other states into adopting policies that would 
compliment an American vision of how the post-war international economy should 
exist.136  Such policies were implemented in countries that appeared valuable to the U.S., 
weak, or susceptive to communistic rule and worked to dismantle trading blocs that were 
set off from American capital.  The United States portrayed the fight against communism 
to the American people as means of securing American safety, promoting democracy and 
aiding the people of the inflicted country and thus justifying any actions against 
communism.137   
The economic prominence within U.S. foreign policy, through the guise of 
communism, is evident in the instances of Greece, Iran and Guatemala.  In 1947, the U.S. 
intervened in a civil war in Greece.  The U.S. supported the neo-fascists over the Left 
simply because of their anti-communism ideals.  In Iran, in 1953, the U.S. overthrew 
elected Prime Minister Mossadegh because of his intentions to national the British-owned 
oil company.  The coup placed the Shah in power; he was responsible for 25 years of 
oppression, torture and abuse.  Lastly, in Guatemala in 1954, the U.S. supported a coup 
d’état against democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz.  Similar to the circumstances in 
Iran, Arbenz had nationalized, which to the U.S. exemplified communism, some of the 
United Fruit Company holdings.  In both Iran and Guatemala, the underlying reason for 
intervention was the protection of economic interests (which can be seen today with 
Occidental Petroleum in Colombia).  Through the decree of communism, the United 
States altered the governments in each of these countries and in each instance replaced 
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democracy with violent, capitalist dictatorships.138  Today, a similar tone is dispersed to 
the U.S. population meaning that intervention and foreign policy can be credited to 
“terrorism” in order to gain support and deter opposition.   
 
September 11’s Rebirth of Modern Day Terrorism 
The switch from the scare of communism to the fright of terrorism did not begin 
in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union, but rather it emerged after al Qaeda’s attacks 
against the United States in 2001.  The large-scale terrorist attacks committed by 
members of al Qaeda on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 
Arlington, Virginia undoubtedly transformed the term “terrorism” into what it is 
perceived to be today.  These acts of terrorism took the lives of nearly 3,000 people on 
September 11, 2001.  “In the entirety of the twentieth century no more than fourteen 
terrorists incidents had killed more than one hundred people.  And until 9/11 no terrorist 
operation had ever killed more than five hundred people.”139  The magnitude of these 
attacks has consequently altered the terminology and connotation.   
 That being said, to reiterate, terrorism has undergone a reformation in recent 
decades; today, “terrorism” is a derogatory term embedded with negative connotations 
rather than a term for specific activity based on the idea of means to an end.140   Marc 
Nicholson, a retired Foreign Service Officer, poses this question, “Do terrorists’ means 
justify their ends,” in his essay entitled, An Essay on Terrorism.  There are “terrorist” 
movements now and in history based on genuine political goals, which resorted to violent 
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tactics because they served as the most effective means available.141  Historically, 
terrorism has been a tool of the oppressed, used by disaffected groups or minorities in 
opposition to oppressive, military-backed powers.142  Yet, the definition of “terrorism” 
has undergone too many forms since its appearance during the French Revolution to have 
a clear definition today.   On the political scene, the over usage of the term has obscured 
the legitimacy and significance of the label, and the ambiguous definition can be applied 
to almost any violent incident.  The determination of which organizations are labeled as 
terrorists is effected primarily by politics.  The issue presented is that when a term 
becomes too politicized, reasoning and truths are skewed in order to legitimize the 
allegation.            
 A direct result of 9/11 and the newly proclaimed fear and label of “terrorism,” in 
direct connection with Colombia, came with President Pastrana’s proclamation of the 
FARC-EP as a terrorist organization.  In February 2002, President Pastrana announced 
that rebels would be treated as terrorists “and in that, the world supports us.”143  Until this 
time, the government of President Andrés Pastrana had never publicly referred to the 
guerillas as terrorists.144 
It was only after Washington went to war against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
US-dominated mass media launched a massive and sustained propaganda blitz 
labeling all critics and adversaries of US global militarism, that the “terrorist” 
label was pinned on the FARC.  Under intense pressure from the elite media and 
under the scrutiny of the US security apparatus, many otherwise progressive 
intellectual and writers caved in and joining the chorus labeling the FARC and 
“terrorists.”145  
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U.S. influence when it comes to the designation of terrorist organizations is immense but 
not necessarily concrete.  The events of September 11 that speared the country’s persona 
and faith placed immeasurable emotional and personalized angst on the word “terrorism.”  
Thus, after the lives of thousands of innocents were stolen by one ill-hearted 
organization, judgment is undoubtedly distorted to create a bias and passion against any 
perspective oppositional forces. 
 
Terrorist or Freedom Fighter?      
Nicholson discusses the idea that if a terrorist organization is successful in 
obtaining its goal, then the leaders and the group itself can then be renamed and accepted 
as successful liberators and figures.  For example, the African National Congress (ANC) 
was created during the apartheid era in South Africa in order to represent the black 
citizens and fight for recognition and rights.  After decades of pacifism, nonviolence and 
community activism, only to be met with brutal state terror, in 1961, the organization 
looked towards violence to further their cause.  They formed a military wing and targeted 
government facilities, the South African military, and some foreign businesses; these 
actions allotted them a place on the U.S. State Department’s terrorist list.146  In 1994, 
Nelson Mandela, who strongly advocated for the creation of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, the 
armed wing of the ANC, became the president of South Africa.147  Mandela went on to 
win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.148  Mandela and the ANC are a perfect example of an 
organization that had few options apart from armed actions to meet their goals.  
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Seemingly, the main difference between the ANC and the FARC-EP is the cause for 
which each group stands.  The ANC organized against racially based inequality, an issue 
that has been faced and dealt with worldwide.  On the other hand, the FARC-EP struggles 
against distribution of wealth, which is prevalent still around the globe, especially in 
countries like the United States and Brazil.  Furthermore, as Roberts notes, in 1987-8 the 
United Kingdom and U.S. governments labeled the ANC as “terrorists,”  
A questionable attribution even at the time not because there had been no 
violence, but because the ANC's use of violence had been discriminate and had 
constituted only a small part of the ANC's overall strategy.149 
 
A similar example in found in that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  The Irish 
were oppressed and abused by English powers since mercenaries invaded Ireland in 
1169.  In 1607, the area known today as Northern Ireland was divided among the English 
and the Scottish.150  Later, religious diversity and minimal rights of the Irish citizens 
further ignited tensions within Ireland and consequently lead to the formation of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish Republican Army.151  During World War I, 
the IRA confronted the British powers and won independence for the Irish Free State, 
Éire.152  Later, the IRA and its chief strategist, Michael Collins, destabilized British rule 
with limited means but remarkable organization and tactic.  “Their experiment brought 
hope to myriad independence movements in Europe and beyond.”153  In 1969, the IRA 
decided to leave violent means behind and move toward politics and negotiations.154  
However, the organization stood divided and consequently the Provisional Irish 
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Republican Army (PIRA), also known as the Provos, and the Official Irish Republican 
Army (OIRA) were created accordingly as the military and political wings.155  As the 
IRA became more powerful in the 1970s, both the political and militant sides took 
actions against the British oppression.  The organization bombed locations, organized 
hunger strikes, developed campaigns, planned protests, discussed cease-fires and resumed 
peace negotiations.156  However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and 
the term “terrorism” became undoubtedly loaded, the IRA noted that they would work to 
dismantle their arms and work towards political resolution for Ireland.157  In the end, in 
2007, Martin McGuiness a former leader of the PIRA, was sworn in as deputy First 
Minister of the Northern Ireland and thus the prospect of political reconciliation is real 
and holds a similar ending to that of Nelson Mandela and the ANC.158 
The examples of the ANC and the IRA demonstrate the first proposed issue of 
this chapter: the difficulties of labeling organizations as “terrorists.”  They represent the 
inaccuracy of the criteria used to designate terrorists as well as the complicity of the term 
itself.  The second proposed matter plaguing the title of “terrorists” is contingent with the 
argument between guerilla warfare and terrorism.  Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, 
experts in the field of guerilla warfare, argue that the terms “terrorism” and “guerrilla 
war” are unfairly used interchangeably.  At this point, guerilla warfare, its origins, tactics, 
definitions and specific cases will be identified and discussed primarily through one of 
Latin America’s most prominent guerilla figures, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, as well as 
China’s Mao Tse-Tung and Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap. 
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Contrast Between Guerillas and Terrorists 
Guerilla warfare as a military term has been in existence since at least the 
commencement of the nineteenth century.  Guerilla warfare seems to surface when forces 
that have greater numbers attack a nation or group of people and more advanced 
technology.159  Guerilla warfare serves as a tactic to undermine the more powerful party 
seemingly obtains the power over the subversive group.  However, a noted 
transformation in the twentieth century of guerilla warfare is the use of guerilla tactics 
internally rather than against an outside unit or power.  For example, Mao Tse-Tung, a 
Chinese communist revolutionary and guerilla warfare strategist who lead China’s 
Revolution, wrote, “our strategy is to ‘pit one against ten,’ and our tactics are ‘pit ten 
against one.’”160  What this means is that guerillas must look for the opportune moments 
to attack their aggressors.   Mao led the communist Red Army of China, and at its 
inception, it was greatly inferior in both size and technology to the state’s White Army, 
Kuomintang.  The manner in which Mao successfully confronted the superior forces is 
through his tactical idea to “pit ten against one.”  He would wait until his army had the 
advantage and work to isolate the opposition so that his forces could  “destroy the enemy 
one by one.”161  In the end, the results of guerilla fighters were due to greater intelligence 
and tactic as well as intimate links with the population.162  
Though Mao Tse-Tung and others such as Vo Nguyen Giap of Vietnam were 
influential and pivotal leaders of their own guerilla movements, this chapter will 
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investigate and detail further into Guevara and his guerilla warfare.  The emphasis is on 
Guevara simply because of the geographical location between Colombia and Cuba.  Che 
Guevara said the victory of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 shows “plainly the capacity of 
the people to free themselves by means of guerilla warfare from a government that 
oppresses them.”163  Che died a “martyr and a prophet for leftist causes and beliefs.”164 
The story and image of Guevara has been popularized and associated with rebellion and 
liberty, but the story and ideology behind Guevara transcends contemporary fashion 
popularity.  In 1961, two years after the successful overthrow of Fulgencio Batista, 
Guevara published a written manual on guerilla warfare.  The account, in detail, describes 
and discusses the main causes, tactics, methods, means and ideas behind the fight for 
liberation and equality based on guerilla strategy.  Marc Becker, a historian, states in the 
introduction to Guevara’s text that,  
Che’s life represents a selfless dedication to the concerns of underclass, a struggle 
to encourage people to place the needs of the broader society above their own 
narrow personal wishes and desires, and a willingness to make extensive personal 
sacrifices to achieve a more just and equable social order.165 
 
 The decade leading up to the Cuban Revolution marked the commencement of 
many socialist revolutionary movements in Latin America.  The ongoing threat of U.S. 
imperialism in countries like Guatemala and Cuba sparked the creation and development 
of policy based more on nationalization and agrarian reform.  Che Guevara and Fidel 
Castro were at the forefront of these changes in Latin America.  The success of the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959 allowed for Guevara’s creation of the three fundamental lessons of 
how to the conduct revolutionary movements in America.  First, popular forces can win a 
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war against the army.  Secondly, it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making 
a revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.  Finally, the underdeveloped 
countryside of the Americas is the basic area for armed fighting.166 
Furthermore, decades before the eminent threat of terrorism and the proclaimed 
attributes of a terrorist organization, Guevara wrote about terrorism and the controversy 
that surrounds the topic.167  He drew a line between terrorism and sabotage.  He was 
aware of the benefits of sabotage over an enemy, but at the same time, he heavily 
emphasized the effects that these violent and deceitful acts would have on the future 
relationships between the opposing forces and thus the prospect of reconciliation and 
negotiations.  
It happens that in a civil war the repression by the government power in certain 
towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed 
already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is 
impossible…At any rate, well-managed sabotage is always a very effective arm, 
though it should not be employed to put means of production out action, leaving a 
sector of the population paralyzed (and thus without work) unless this paralysis 
affects the normal life of the society.168 
 
He continues to discuss sabotage as “one of the invaluable arms of a people that fights in 
guerilla form.”169  Guevara introduces sabotage because it is a tactic that proves 
increasingly beneficial when alternative options have been exhausted.  Much of 
Guevara’s ideology is found throughout the FARC-EP and they way in which they are 
organized and operated. 
Since guerillas and insurgents often employ the same tactics (assassination, 
kidnapping, hit-and-run attack, bombings and hostage-taking) just as known terrorist 
                                                 
166 Guevara, 7. 
167 Guevara, 22. 
168 Guevara, 22. 
169 Guevara, 99. 
 50
organization do, the connection can be made.170  However, the FARC-EP does not 
kidnap innocent people in hopes to instill fear in the people.  Instead, according to the 
U.S. State Department, “terrorist groups such as the FARC, the National Liberation Arm
(ELN), and other criminal organizations continue to kidnap and hold civilians for ransom
or as political bargaining chips.”
y 
 
y and 
’s 
ower. 
                                                
171  Moreover, though exact numbers and lists of 
offenses attributed to the FARC-EP are nearly impossible to encounter, the majority of 
the attacks associated with the insurgency are directed towards the Colombian Arm
not civilians.  However, the majority of the bombings and killings that the media 
connects with the FARC-EP emphasize not only attacks against the police and the 
Colombian Army but against Colombian civilians.  There are in fact many instances in 
which both indigenous and Afro-Colombians have been gravely affected by Colombia
internal conflict.  These acts should be noted and condemned.  However, the heart of the 
attacks are against the national p
It is important to highlight the FARC’s infractions against civilians.  The FARC-
EP has been named responsible for the La Gabarra Massacre in 1996 where 34 coca 
farmers were killed due to supposed drug related motivations.172   Another horrific 
massacre due to the violence between the AUC and the FARC-EP took place in Bojayá, 
Chocó, a department comprised mostly of afro-Colombians.  A reported 119 civilians 
were killed in the territorial dispute between the guerillas and the paramilitary.173  
Although these massacres are terrible and unjust, the FARC-EP typically targets the 
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military and not civilians, however, in reality in any civil war, there are civilian 
casualties.  For example, common FARC-EP attacks are the destruction of military bases, 
like that of Miraflores in southern Guaviare or similar to in 1998 when FARC-EP 
combatants ambushed the 52nd counter-guerilla battalion.174  
 
The FARC-EP True Guerilla Insurgents  
 
Bruce Hoffman, the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at 
Georgetown University and former Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and 
Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation, states that guerilla groups typically have a 
large number of armed individuals and military hierarchy.  They also lead attacks against 
enemy military forces, seize and hold territory in order to form sovereign control over a 
defined geographical area and its population.175  While on the other hand, terrorists do 
not function openly as an armed unit, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territo
avoid engaging enemy military forces, have little control over mass mobilization and see 
little to no dominance on both local and national levels.
ry, 
                                                
176  Moreover, terrorist groups 
focus on lone assassinations or will have a maximum amount of 40-50 people involved in 
one mission.  Furthermore, guerrillas and terrorists differ additionally in their choice of 
weaponry; where terrorist organizations use homemade bombs, car bombs, explosives 
etc., the FARC-EP and guerrilla groups use more military type arms like rifles and 
machine guns.  
According to Hoffman’s, Inside Terrorism, “nearly a third of the thirty-seven 
groups on the U.S. State Department’s ‘Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ list 
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could just as easily be categorized as guerillas.”177  Aforementioned justifications of the 
FARC-EP as a guerilla group allow for the assumption that the Marxist-Leninist group 
would fall into the third of the organizations that should be rightfully omitted from the 
U.S. State Department’s list. 
Additionally, along with the term terrorism, a newly fashioned title, “narco-
terrorism” has been applied internationally to further disparage organizations like that of 
the FARC-EP.  Narco-terrorism, a term developed in the mid 1980s, is typically defined 
as, the “use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and 
terrorist organizations.”178  In regards to the FARC-EP, Isacson agrees that the term 
unjustly gives the organization a bad name internationally and implies that they do not 
have a social base or agenda.   
 
Violent Conclusion 
This thesis does not support terrorism, the violence it creates or the deaths it 
causes.  However, it does examine and understand the differences between guerilla 
insurgencies and terrorist groups.  Additionally, it examines the legitimacy of the term 
“terrorism” as it has been greatly modified, overused and politicized in past years.  
Similarly, this research also realizes and acknowledges the history of terrorism and the 
reasoning behind means to an end tactics.  The discerning acts of the FARC-EP are 
condemned and recognized as the killings and kidnappings of innocent citizens should 
never be a sought out option for success.  However, the existence and ideology of the 
guerrilla group are valued.  The analysis and research provided by the history of terrorism 
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as well as the contrast between guerilla groups and terrorists coupled with recent 
insignificance of the term “terrorism” create a base to comprehend and appreciate the 
laudable objectives of the insurgency and the means of which they have undertaken to 
achieve said goals. 
As contextualized by the previous chapter, the history of violence and unjust 
governing in Colombia provides a base for the intentions and actions of the FARC-EP.  
Violence and corruption are present in the offices of the government and the armies of 
the right wing paramilitaries, not just the FARC-EP.  In order to compete with opposing 
forces while simultaneously increasing support, the insurgency has had no choice but to 
intensify their actions.  The disputing forces are not innocent and flawless in Colombia, 
thus the portrayal of the FARC-EP as a terrorist organization cannot be perceived without 
the analysis and description of the government’s armed forces and the right-wing 
paramilitaries of the country.  A poignant conclusion is that, in retrospect, in comparison 
with the dueling powers in Colombia, the FARC-EP is the lesser of all evils.  The 
intertwined political and economic connections between each of these parties further 
emphasize reasons for the tainted reputation of the insurgency denounced by 
governmental administrations.   
The subsequent chapter will use the material discussed here to open investigation 
between the dueling military groups engaged in civil war in Colombia.  Right-wing 
paramilitaries will be introduced and contextualized as their connection with the 
Colombian government is dissected.  These paramilitaries along with the Colombian 
armed forces are responsible for human rights abuses and scores of extra-judicial murders 
throughout the country; total blame for the violent circumstances of Colombia and its 
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civil war cannot be solely attributed to the guerillas.  Guerilla compliance and peace talks 
are another primary topic established at the forefront of the following chapter.  The 
section also recognizes and investigates U.S. foreign policy and its detrimental affect on 
Colombian society, specifically that of the rural farmers and the insurgents fighting for 
their cause.  U.S. influence towards certain policies and the implementation of Plan 
Colombia are discussed as well as the underlying economic ties that accompany the plan.  
From these economic ties, U.S. infiltration emerges and as a result, U.S. citizens, Marc 
Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Tom Howes, working for the private contracting company 
Northrop Grumman, were kidnapped by the FARC-EP guerillas.  This specific event and 
their story opens the discussion on the insurgency’s tactic and increasing amount of 
kidnappings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Peace Talks, Plan Colombia and Secuestrados 
 
 
 The FARC developed directly to oppose the status quo.  Such a bold move has not 
only distressed the government that they openly combat, but consequently, in an 
interconnected political and economic world, upset and made an enemy out of the United 
States.  In return to the rebels’ opposition, the previous chapter discussed the ways in 
which Colombian and U.S. administrations have discredited the insurgency.  However, 
this section uncovers the true, misrepresented reasoning behind the United States’ role in 
combating drugs and terrorists in Colombia.    
 Corruption plagues Colombia, and consequently it hinders the political process 
between the guerrillas and the government.  Although the FARC-EP has taken part in 
peace talks with various Colombian administrations, reconciliation exceeds agendas and 
planned negotiations.  The United States’ interference and accelerated policies 
complicate the relationship between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government.  The 
fact is that the U.S. does not allocate billions of dollars to Colombia to make the country 
safe and ridden of drugs and rebels.  Instead, the U.S.’s main interests in Colombia 
resonate in economic profit.  Occidental Petroleum and the oil fields of Colombia seem to 
be the actual motives for U.S. influence and propagation against the FARC-EP that 
deems them terrorists.  U.S. intervention and policies towards Colombia serve as a tidal 
wave of speculation and hidden agendas.  Furthermore, the role that the United States 
plays in Colombia is responsible for the kidnapping of, in a specific case, three U.S. 
contractors for Northrop Grumman. 
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Peace Talks and Negotiations 
Throughout the history of the FARC and the civil war in Colombia, four 
administrations have worked towards negotiations with the guerillas.  The process and 
negotiations began in 1982 with Belisario Betancur (1982-86).  Virgilio Barco (1986-90) 
continued talks at the end of his administration and they began again during the first 
years of the César Gaviria (1990-94) government. Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) later 
reopened the peace talks.  However, talks did not continue into President Uribe’s 
administration and it does not appear that current President Juan Manuel Santos will 
initiate talks either.179  During these talks and negotiations, the FARC-EP was not the 
only organization involved.  In the first talks, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular 
Liberation Army-EPL), the ELN and the Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April 
Movement- M-19) each took part in negotiations with Betancur.180  During these talks 
with Betancur, the FARC, M-19 and EPL and the Colombian government reached similar 
agreements that included,  
A cease-fire for one year; the creation of a high-level commission to verify 
compliance with the agreement; the granting of a series of juridical, political and 
social guarantees to facilitate the transition of the guerilla forces back to civilian 
life; and a rehabilitation program for peasant areas affected by the violence.181   
 
However, both the EPL and the M-19 violated these truces while the FARC remained in 
the ceasefire for the duration of their agreement.182  Furthermore, during the first round 
of peace talks with Betancur, the commissioners insisted that the FARC condemn the 
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practices of kidnapping and extortion.  In return, the FARC insisted that the government 
must,  
Modernize the political institutions, enable agrarian reform, facilitate the 
mobilization of campesinos and indigenous groups, strengthen education, health, 
housing and labour policy, establish a policy of public order under the sole control 
of the institutional forces of the state and initiate reconciliation processes.183  
 
The FARC’s active involvement in a series of peace negotiations demonstrates its 
commitment and desire to resolve the fundamental issues that urged the creation of the 
guerilla insurgency decades before. As Colombia has not seen a revolution since the fight 
for independence from Spain, the ideas and goals of the FARC are not uncommon or 
outlandish; they can be deemed reasonable and justified.  Similar desires have been 
revolutionized throughout Latin America and much of the world preceding the inception 
of the guerilla group in the 1960s.  Years after the first peace talks, in 1993, the FARC-
EP and its leader and founder, Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulanda Vélez, issued a proposed 
agenda for the peace negotiations with the Gaviria administration, in which he outlined 
the goals and ideology of the nearly forty-year-old insurgency. 
 
1. A political solution to the grave conflict in which the country is living. 
2. A reform of the national military, reducing it to a seize adequate to defend 
national borders and sovereignty 
3. Political reform through strengthening democratic participation 
4. Development and social justice, with private investment allowed in vital sectors 
such as energy, communications, public services, roads, ports, and the production 
of natural resources, but that the States should remain as the principal owner. 
5. Social well-being, with 50 percent of the national budget dedicated to welfare, job 
creation, education, health and housing. 
6. Income redistribution, though the value-added tax being applied only to luxury 
goods and services and with people with higher income paying higher income 
taxes. 
7. An agrarian policy based on the elimination of large land holdings 
8. Renegotiation of national resource exploration contracts with the multinational 
corporations, but not nationalization 
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9. A change of foreign relations though a ten-year moratorium on foreign debt 
payments and a revision of military arrangements. 
10. The solution to the production and marketing of narcotics with the financial 
support of the international community.184 
 
Marulanda has been the Commander in Chief since the creation of the organization, 
which allows for the stipulation that the goals and objectives of the FARC-EP have 
foreseen little change.  Although methods, techniques and times have changed the 
fundamental principles of the FARC-EP remain intact through their armed struggle for 
equality.  However, it is difficult to attain a current agenda or goals for today’s FARC-EP 
with a new leader, Alfonso Cano.    
 
Damage of Plan Colombia  
On December 19, 1998, weeks before the first talks between Tirofijo and Pastrana 
commenced, Pastrana revealed the intentions of “Plan Colombia.”  The plan was 
coordinated by Pastrana’s Commissioner Victor Ricardo, and they announced that the 
plan would be financed though resources of the state, the private sector and the 
international community.  It was aimed towards aid for displaced citizens due to internal 
violence; aid would be given through legal title to lands as well as through projects 
intended to make the land more productive.185  The planned purpose of Plan Colombia 
was to assist small farmers in the substitution of illicit crops in hopes of limiting coca and 
heroin poppy production throughout the countryside.  Since the plan was proposed weeks 
before scheduled talks, Pastrana urged that the guerilla groups should contribute and 
adopt the plan “in the interest of a true reconciliation and in order to guarantee the 
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success of a fundamental peace process.”186  Initially, Pastrana envisioned Plan Colombia 
as a sort of Marshall Plan for Colombia that would allot large amounts of money to social 
programs and education.  However, the U.S. government intervened and the program 
became a military program that would cause deeper issues within Colombia.187  
Plan Colombia, as it is today, is a billion dollar investment from primarily the 
United States to eradicate coca cultivation in Colombia.  It was created by the Pastrana 
administration in 1998; the initial plan did not involve heavy U.S. and military influence; 
however, the Clinton administration altered the initiative to a draft as it remains today 
under the Obama administration.  The agreement between the U.S. and Colombia in 1998 
became a $1.3 billion agreement, less than twenty per cent of which would be spent on 
alternative options for the Colombian farmers.188  The Colombian government would 
contest that they provide the campesinos with opportunities beyond cultivating coca and 
compensate the growers that chose different means of agriculture.  According to William 
Brownfield, of the U.S. State Department and former Ambassador to Colombia, those 
coca growers that cease to cultivate coca and sign an agreement with the Colombian 
government will be provided assistance and support that will allow them to live a decent 
life.  However, the Mayor of Puerto Aziz, southern Colombia, counters the former 
Ambassador’s statement and says,  
Two million pesos or 950USD is not enough to live on.  A family of five cannot 
survive one year on 950USD…what is provided is very little, we think it will be 
very difficult for the farmers to stop growing coca if the government doesn’t give 
them proper assistance.189  
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James H. Williams of the U.S. embassy in Bogotá states that the Colombian 
government and the U.S. are collaborating in order to reduce production of cocaine and 
trafficking in Colombia.  He mentions that the governments provide an alternative to 
traditional coca growers and offers “a genuine economic alternative that is 
environmentally sound and economically viable.”190  What the government suggests 
instead is the cultivation of yucca, pineapple and other crops.  However, these small 
farmers do not have the means to transport their crops nor can they compete with the 
other economies, which is why many continue to grow coca and work with the 
guerillas.191  The truth is that the rural farmers and workers live in abandoned areas, have 
no economic opportunities and are all but forgotten by the government.  “Hundreds of 
thousands of farmers driven to poverty by the international agro-business competition 
have been hired by the traffickers.”192  These are the exact reasons why the FARC was 
formed initially and why they still work to aid the farmers when the government’s plans 
fail. 
In addition, Plan Colombia not only fails to provide the campesinos with other 
viable, lucrative alternatives, it spreads danger and disease through the herbicides that 
contractor companies are hired to spray on the coca fields.  However, coca fields are not 
the only locations that are hit with the toxic herbicides.  Farmers have reported that their 
personal crops such as yucca and banana as well as local fish populations are affected by 
the spread of the toxins and fumes.193  Moreover, U.S. Congressman, Jim McGovern (D, 
M.A.), believes that aerial fumigation is a human rights violation.  This contention is 
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supported by Dr. Theo Colborn of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), who argues that 
there has been a definite increase in skin disease in the Colombian regions hit by 
Monsanto’s chemical, Roundup Ultra.194  The effects due to the deadly chemicals of 
Monsanto have been seen not only in Colombia, but in Brazil, Ecuador and Peru as well. 
In 2002, the U.S. State Department reported that there are no harmful effects from the 
pesticides on the people and the herbicides do not pose health risks.195  Moreover, Dr. 
Colborn confirms that glyphosate, or Monsanto’s Roundup Ultra, can cause tumors in the 
thyroid, pancreas and testicles.  Further studies have shown that the glyphosate interferes 
with the enzyme systems in the thyroid, liver, pancreas and the brain.196  According to 
studies conducted by Colombia’s national human rights ombudsman in 2001 and 2002, 
the spraying glyphosate has both killed the legal crops within communities of southern 
Colombia as well as caused health problems due to inhalation and contact with the 
chemicals.197  She observes the comparison between Colombia and the herbicides that 
were sprayed in Vietnam by the U.S. during the Vietnam War, that are now linked to 
child mutations and chronic illnesses.  
 
Plan Colombia or Plan U.S.A 
Noted linguist and professor Noam Chomsky questions in the documentary Plan 
Colombia: Cashing in on the Drug War Failure, what gives the United States the right to 
intervene and take actions in other countries.  He alludes to the comparison; if another 
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country were to spray herbicides on U.S. citizens’ fields there would be an uproar.198  
Yet, the United States has a long history of intervention in foreign countries.  While the 
government will argue and maintain ethical and social motivations for intervention, in 
reality much of U.S. foreign policy can be connected to economic purpose.  As author 
and expert on American foreign policy, William Blum says, U.S. foreign policy is based 
on “making the world safe for American corporations, enhancing their financial 
statements, and preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a successful 
example of an alternative capitalist model.”199 
Conveniently in Colombia, the “War on Drugs” is the scapegoat for U.S. 
influence and creation of Plan Colombia just as terrorism serves as the justification for 
war against the FARC-EP.  The U.S. State Department will sustain that the military aid, 
training, money and resources appropriated to the Colombian government are issued for 
the feat against drugs.  However, in both the documentary Plan Colombia and Josh 
Rushing, of Al Jezeera’s Fault Lines, interview with Leech, it is concluded that the 
counter-narcotics war in Colombia is more of a counter-insurgency battle.200  Evidence to 
legitimize this statement lies in the number of drug fields that are sprayed in guerilla 
territory versus the amount sprayed in paramilitary lands.201  The paramilitaries, namely 
the AUC’s, known connections with the Colombian government liberate them from the 
unjust and dangerous herbicides that are spread over the poor, rural coca farmers of the 
countryside.  Further conclusion and debate over Plan Colombia lies in the economic 
reasoning and reliance that the United States has in Colombia and its oil wealth.   
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As of 2002, the annual sales of Occidental Petroleum Corporations, which is one 
of the largest U.S.-based oil and gas multinationals, were $14 billion and the annual net 
income was $1.2 billion.202  Oil is a premium commodity in Colombia.  In 1983, 
Occidental discovered the Caño Limón pipeline; it is the second largest oil field in 
Colombia and one of only fifty billion-barrel-class fields in the world. 203  Occidental's 
share in Caño Limón alone yields hundreds of millions of dollars annually.  The primary 
concern of the U.S. is to maintain control of the pipeline and oil fields.  However, 
hypothetically speaking, if a Leftist-guerilla group were to gain power or control of the 
Colombian government, then there is the possibility that the oil industry within Colombia 
would be nationalized or severed from U.S. control.  Thus comes the intervention and 
abundance of aid from the United States to Colombia; in 2002 Colombia received the 
third highest amount of aid from the United States after Egypt and Israel.204 
 
U.S. Intervention   
Similarly, in Chile the threat of nationalizing the copper industry erupted in the 
midst of the Cold War.  However, under the guise of fighting communism, the U.S. 
government justified their intervention and eventual facilitation of a harsh dictatorial rule.  
Democratically elected President Salvador Allende’s fight for nationalist movements 
created concerns for the United States and in turn the Nixon administration utilized 
propaganda and manipulation in order to gain economic control within Chile through the 
common legitimization of the fight against communism.  The United States identified 
Allende’s call to nationalize Chile’s copper industry and prospective land reforms as a 
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step towards communism and thus intervened based on national interest and security.  To 
the U.S., the imminent threat of communism justified its right to promote capitalism 
abroad.  However, in reality even though Santiago had relations with Havana and 
Moscow, it was still a weak constitutional coalition and it did not seek ties with Soviets 
like the ties that they had with Havana.205  Nevertheless, the United States saw an 
opportunity to use their foreign policy tactics to further expand capitalism and protect 
U.S. investments that would otherwise be threatened by nationalization. 
 The Chilean economy was based on copper, yet the country did not have control 
of the resource; ownership rested mainly in the hands of two United States companies, 
Kennecott and Anaconda.  Thus, when Allende took power, he and Congress in 1971 
unanimously voted to nationalize the resource so that benefits could be seen at home 
instead of abroad.206  The United States inserted power and influence within the country, 
in order to push the country to free-market ideals.  The U.S. did this through means of 
coercion and through aid that led to the instillation and military coup of General Pinochet 
in 1973, and all because of the threat of losing the profit of the copper industry.207 
 In the end, capitalism spread and Chile became a free-market economy.  However 
it came at a price of thousands of murders and disappearances issued by the dictator, 
Pinochet.  Soon thereafter, to further aid Chile in its quest for capitalism, famed 
economist Milton Friedman flew to the country to discuss how to deal with inflation and 
policies that would support and promote a free-market economy.  He stated that, there is 
an “inescapable link between free markets and freedom,” while stressing that a repressive 
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government and a free economy do not generally coincide.208  Once the U.S.-backed 
general assumed power, he and his administration looked towards the “Chicago Boys” in 
order to jump-start a new economy based on free-market ideals and to also push it further 
away from Leftist-elected Allende’s policies.  The “Chicago Boys” were Chicago-
educated economists from Chile that helped bring what they had learned at the Chicago 
School of Economics to Chile to stabilize a U.S. friendly economy.209  This tangent and 
comparison in Chile illustrates the common relationship that the U.S. holds with many 
Latin and Central American countries.  A similar issue persists in Colombia in regards to 
the Leftist FARC-EP and the oil industry.  The eminent threat of nationalization and 
limited U.S. benefits scares the U.S. government, and thus the “War on Drugs” and fight 
against terrorism are heavily implemented and pursued in Colombia. 
 
United States Economic Protection  
In 2002, the United States’ budget for the war on terrorism and the defense of 
national security was $27 billion.  Of that amount, $35 million was allotted to 
counterinsurgency activities in Colombia, the U.S. was also granted authority to use the 
aid for counternarcotics as well as counterterrorism in Colombia.210  However, 
controversy arises around the fact that the U.S. gives millions of dollars in aid to 
Colombia even though the government and military units are involved in extrajudicial 
murders or “false-positives,” today.  These are murders of civilians that are later 
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presented as guerillas killed in combat.211  In recent years, the Colombian Supreme Court 
began investigations based on accusations against members of the Colombian Congress 
and their collaboration with the paramilitaries.  For example, as previously discussed, 
currently in Colombia persists the matter of the “parapolitics” scandal where more than 
eighty members of Uribe’s Congress are being investigated.212 
In addition, under the Leahy Amendment, named for Senator Patrick Leahy (D., 
V.T.), the U.S. is prohibited from funding foreign security units in nations that have had 
reported human rights abuses.213  Yet, the President has the authority to waive the 
amendment if the conditions at hand will affect U.S. national security; both Clinton and 
Bush waived the amendment regardless of the fact that there were a minimal amount of 
changes in the human rights abuses.214  According to the Internal Displaced Monitoring 
Centre, today, Colombia has between 3,303,979 and 4,915,579 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).215  This statistic does not include intra-urban displacement or the people 
displaced by crop fumigations, and it is derived from the government’s cumulative 
figures since 2000. 216  As of 2008, Colombia had the third largest population of 
internally displaced people.217  According to Refugee International, nearly 200,000 
persons are displaced a year in Colombia due to the armed internal conflict.  The ultimate 
goal of organizations like Refugees International is to aid these citizens in a return home, 
however, much of the time it is neither sustainable nor safe to go back.  The situation of 
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the displaced people is further escalated due to the lack of government support.218  The 
people who are primarily affected by the violence of both the guerillas and paramilitaries 
are the rural campesinos as well as the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.219 
Once the families are displaced, they search for undesirable land to set up camp.  The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that IDPs end up 
living in slums in the periphery of large cities, which lack basic services.  For example, 
outside of Bogotá alone there are tens of thousands of IDPs in the shantytowns of Altos 
de Cazuca and Altos de Florida.  In these barrios there is little access to health, education 
or decent housing nor do those affected people have money or a place to live.220  On-
going violence between the guerillas and the paramilitaries is the primary cause for the 
IDPs in Colombia.  In many instances, guerillas and paramilitaries threaten and coerce 
populations into supporting their respective group.  If the towns do not comply they do 
see the consequence.  
In spite of human rights abuses and huge amounts of IDPs, the Bush 
administration requested that Colombia receive over $500 million in addition to the aid 
already designated to the “War on Drugs.”221  Evidence points towards U.S. economic 
investments in Colombia as the reason for the increased amounts of aid as well as the 
constant intervention and politics between the two nations.  The economic ties come 
primarily from the Caño Limón oil pipeline located in the eastern Colombian province of 
Arauca, in which the American company Occidental Petroleum holds many shares.  In a 
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2002 budget proposal to Congress, Bush requested that approximately $100 million be 
spent on training and equipment for new Colombian army brigades to protect the 
lucrative pipeline.222  The pipeline is, along with military bases and units, a major point 
of attack for the Leftist guerillas in Colombia.  The pipeline has been targeted by both the 
FARC-EP and the ELN over one thousand times in the past 25 years. 223  The majority of 
the oil is exported to the United States and turned into profit.  The influence of the U.S. in 
the oil industry in Colombia has similar aspects and correlations with that of the copper 
industry in Chile of the 1970s.  The documentary, Plan Colombia: Cashing in on the 
Drug War, concludes that the heavy influence and U.S. role in Colombia is primarily 
based on economic profit.  However, the U.S. maintains legitimacy by the declaration of 
a war against drugs, terrorists and insurgencies.  Furthermore, their fight against the 
guerillas is beneficial because the fall of the insurgency would eliminate the prospect of 
the nationalization of the oil industry if the FARC-EP were in fact able to gain a position 
in the government.  In conclusion, the fight and vilification of the Leftist guerilla group is 
no more than a plot to reduce the chance for a non-capitalist government to come into 
power in Colombia and thus gain control of the oil export. 
 
U.S. Profit and Personal Accounts 
Unfortunately, economic and political matters appear to overpower the social 
aspects of Plan Colombia.  Not only have we seen how the United States has intervened 
in Colombia in order to protect its assets in oil, but the implementation of Plan Colombia 
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itself has allowed for billions of dollars to be funneled back into U.S. corporations such 
as Monsanto, Northrop Grumman, Bell Helicopter Textron and Sikorsky Aircraft.224  
According to William Hartung of the World Policy Institute, “it is not so much an aid 
program as much as another way to subsidize the military industrial complex in the 
United States.”225  Furthermore, the privatization of the war on drugs is due to the lack of 
support by the public.  Former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld “suggests that it is 
more economical to use contractors, rather than regular troops, because the army is 
stretched beyond capacity.”226  Isacson contributes in the documentary Plan Colombia: 
Cashing in on the Drug War that no European or Latin American country supports the 
U.S. role or strategy issued by Plan Colombia.  In the end, the influence and role of the 
U.S. along with the powers of the Colombian government are not exactly as they seem, 
instead, “Plan Colombia is more counterinsurgency than counternarcotics.”227 
The ever-present influence and intervention of the United States is responsible for 
the abduction of three U.S. contractors, Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Tom Howes, 
by the Colombian insurgents.  The three men worked as a drug surveillance unit for 
Northrop Grumman, a global security and private, multinational defense corporation; it is 
the fifth largest in the United States as it works to fight drugs in Colombia.228  The 
company works with the United States’ government to survey drug areas as well as to 
spray herbicides over the coca fields in Colombia.  Gonsalves, Stansell and Howes were 
“mostly looking for coca fields and drug-processing labs under the control of the 
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principal revolutionary forces in Colombia, the FARC.”229 These flights and surveillance 
were initiated during the Pastrana administration in accordance with Plan Colombia, 
which was created in 1999.230    
While this thesis has thus far favored the FARC-EP, the story of the three 
American contractors who crash-landed in the jungle sheds a different light on the 
insurgency, an image in accordance with the favored portrayal depicted by the hardliner 
governments.  The vivid retelling of the three American contractors for Northrop 
Grumman, who were captured by the FARC-EP through Out of Captivity: Surviving 
1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle confronts an assortment of issues and gives detailed 
scenarios of life as a hostage to a rebel force in the Colombian jungle.  The trio spent five 
plus years in the Colombian jungle and countryside at the hands of the guerrillas; they 
were subjected to extreme living conditions, were forced to wear chains, were 
malnourished, forced to march for weeks and saw minimal and inadequate healthcare.  
On July 2, 2008 the three men along with Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid 
Betancourt and eleven other hostages were rescued.  There is no doubt that Gonsalves, 
Stansell and Howes were tried physically, mentally and emotionally for years as their 
future lay in the uncertain hands of the FARC-EP.231 
The written memoir of the three men is a compelling and remarkable story that 
evokes sheer emotion and clearly depicts and arouses true images of their pain and 
suffering, especially through the scenes where they discuss the importance of the radio.  
In Colombia, there are radio stations that for hours play only messages from family 
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members of kidnapped persons to their missing loved one.  Yet, while sympathy is the 
only feeling that the thesis directs towards the victims, criticism can be placed on the 
corporations and the governments.  As previously discussed, the actual motives and basis 
for U.S. intervention and implementation of Plan Colombia are seemingly skewed by 
economic entities.  As a result, private contractors are sent into Colombia to eradicate 
farmlands of peasants trying to make a living under the pretense that campesinos provide 
for and fuel the drug trade.   One quote from Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in 
the Colombian Jungle suggests a direct lack of knowledge from the men and women who 
are sent to take part in such a large-scale plan.  In a section written by the youngest, Marc 
Gonsalves, he tries to discredit and belittle the youth that follow the guerillas, but instead 
he demonstrates his own innate ignorance of the vastness of the complexities that 
encompass the guerillas’ struggle in their country.  He says, 
We ran into our own ¿quién sabe? when we tried to imagine what these young 
men and women’s lives had been like, how bad the conditions of their existence 
must have been to make them think that joining the FARC was a step up.  A few 
of them we asked told us the same reason for having joined the guerrillas: “la 
violencia.”  They didn’t go on to explain what violence had been done to them 
personally, and we wondered if maybe they mean that they enjoyed being able to 
inflict damage on other people.”232 
 
While it is understood that a memoir written by hostages of the guerrilla group would be 
negative and would condemn the organization to its roots, the Colombian and U.S. 
governments do not have the same emotional strife to legitimize their active vilification.    
The U.S. dedication and involvement in Plan Colombia and aid in general to Colombia 
exemplifies why both Colombian and United States administrations defame the guerilla 
insurgency, the FARC-EP.  United States’ investments and interests in Colombian 
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resources and economics serve as fuel to vilify and publicly denounce the Leftist 
insurgency. 
 At this point, we have seen how the history of Colombia has shaped the violence 
that still exists today.  The battle between Liberals and Conservatives can be argued as 
the catalyst behind the undeniable connection between violence and politics.  
Furthermore, this violence brought forth a cause for Leftist rebels to fight.  Emphasized 
through the political and economic connections between the United States and Colombia, 
it has been demonstrated that the FARC-EP has not been easily categorized as a 
“terrorist” organization based on designated credentials or justifications.  The following 
chapter will tie each of these chapters on history, terrorism and U.S. influence together in 
order to asserts an argument on the falsities of the label of “terrorist” associated with the 
FARC-EP. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
How will the FARC-EP Fair? 
 
 As Colombian journalist and author of Country of Bullets: Chronicles of War, 
Juanita León acknowledges in her book, the “true” story behind events can be hidden, 
waiting to be uncovered.  She also alludes to the fact that the truth lies within the people 
of Colombia, the thousands who are affected by the armed conflict daily, rather than 
mainstream newspapers and public media, which denote the conflict with a political 
emphasis and charge.  This concept completely encapsulates the civil war and strife that 
has for decades plagued the country.  As this thesis has demonstrated, simplicity is not a 
characteristic that follows the many relationships or labels that media and countless U.S. 
and Colombian administrations have designated unto the FARC-EP. 
 It has also worked to demonstrate a great spectrum of opinions on the guerilla 
insurgency.  Through personal accounts of kidnapped persons like that of the United 
States contractors for Northrop Grumman, and in León’s retellings of affected people 
throughout Colombia, the thesis accounts for the negative, abusive and unjust actions of 
the FARC-EP.  In addition, former Leftist guerilla groups such as the ELN as well as the 
wrong doings of the right-winged paramilitaries and the Colombian armed forces are 
addressed.  In comparison, staunch believers and Leftist sympathizers found in James 
Brittain and James Petras develop the perception of the FARC-EP as the marginalized 
and oppressed forces of the countryside that have nobly joined together to protect the 
interests of the people.  
Common rhetoric and discourse surrounding the rebels has long been established 
in order to protect political powers while simultaneously discrediting the insurgency.  
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The FARC-EP has been labeled “terrorists” and “narco-terrorists.”  Such accusations 
have warranted U.S. intervention and harsh polices to suppress the insurgency and its 
campesino combatants.  The struggle nears its fifty-year mark and the government still 
has not reacted to the circumstances of the rural poor in Colombia.  Consequently, the 
rebel force continues to transform with the times to maintain powers within the country.  
In response, the government has further demonized the organization and since the Uribe 
administration of 2002 peace talks and negotiations have been halted and condemned. 
 The ensuing civil battles between Leftist guerilla fighters, right-wing 
paramilitaries and the Colombian government have ravaged and intimidated the country 
for decades.  However, today, the Colombian and U.S. governments easily classify the 
initial peasant uprising and the formation of the FARC as terrorism.  Present accusations 
are reliant on media portrayal and the random incidents and actions of the FARC-EP; the 
media and the government seemingly omit the context of the violence in Colombia while 
discussing the role of the FARC-EP.  This unjust classification and vilification of the 
insurgency is what influenced the research on the root of the conflict.  The conflict did 
not begin with guerilla attacks on the armed forces or civilians, but instead it surfaced as 
a clash between Colombia’s political powers of the Liberals and Conservatives.         
The incorporation of the chapter discussing history serves to uncover the origins 
of violent politics and inequality in Colombia.  In the mid nineteenth century, 
independence from Spain left the power still in the hands of the wealthy landowners and 
consequently rural poor were left marginalized and oppressed by politics and Colombian 
society.  After violence erupted and the poor saw more abuse, need for revolution and 
change was abundant.  Thus, the Marquetalia Republic organized to fight U.S. and 
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Colombian forces and later served to form the FARC in order to further their struggle 
against such powers.  These actions of the Colombian and U.S. governments coupled 
with the disregard for the lower class population legitimized the creation of a resistance 
force.  However, a “resistance” force or and organization that directly confronts the status 
quo automatically falls into a combat zone of hardline governments.  As a result, the 
initial war against the guerillas was valid under the pretense of the “War on Drugs” and 
today the battle to dismantle the FARC-EP is masked by the “War on Terrorism.” 
There has seemingly been a surge in international press coverage of the FARC-EP 
in recent months.  Perhaps it can be attributed to the deaths of prominent figures in the 
organization, the global political climate, the release of hostages or new means for 
FARC-EP income.  However, news sources in Colombia have updated stories on the 
FARC-EP almost daily.  Specifically, Bogotá’s newspaper El Tiempo, on March 21, 
2011, reported on a link between the rebel insurgency and Muammar Gadhafi.233  Libya’s 
Gadhafi is currently the center of attention as the harsh dictator of Libya who shows no 
mercy to his own citizens.  Gadhafi’s oppression of his own people has warranted the 
actions of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Furthermore, reports have not only linked he FARC-EP with Gadhafi but with Daniel 
Ortega of Nicaragua as well.  Ortega led the Sandinistas to overthrow the dictatorship of 
the Somoza family.  As a result, the Reagan administration vilified Ortega primarily 
because of his differing views.  In conclusion, it seems that the sole purpose for the 
resurfacing of these accusations, previously reported in 2000, about the links between 
Gadhafi and the FARC-EP is to connect the insurgency with negative figures in hopes of 
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further discrediting their image and cause.  Gadhafi serves as a current day example of 
how the media works to manipulate the global representation of FARC-EP.  
This thesis examined how and why the FARC has transformed from the Leftist 
guerilla group as it began in 1966 to being portrayed as a terrorist organization involved 
in drug production as it has been named through mass media and the past administrations 
in the United States and Colombia.  Research accompanies the argument that opposition 
forces to the FARC-EP have publicly and internationally demonized the insurgency 
because it poses a threat to the state.  History shows that the insurgency began to pursue 
this exact path: to speak out against wealthy landowners and to give a voice to the 
exploited and forgotten.  Instead of cooperating and compromising, countless Colombian 
administrations have silenced the call for equality.  As a result, violence runs rampant 
throughout Colombia on all sides of the conflict.  Research concludes that civil war in 
Colombia cannot place a “good” or “bad” label on the guerillas; history and current 
political situations confuse and complicate the fight and struggle.  In addition, economic 
prospects and international intervention further deepen the battle between the FARC-EP 
and Colombia’s government.  It is hard to grasp the complexities of the internal battles 
within Colombia based solely on media coverage and U.S. and Colombian propaganda.  
In conclusion, the image of the FARC-EP is not fairly depicted and can only be so with a 
contrast between the other conflicting armed forces within Colombia.  Since these 
comparisons are not prevalent, it is easy for the United States and Colombia to illustrate 
the FARC-EP publicly in a light that is beneficial to their political and economic goals.  
In the case of the Leftist guerilla organization of the FARC-EP it is the perception and 
label of “terrorists” that keeps them suppressed and demonized.      
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